tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2473166537823294555.post1962454932748956013..comments2023-11-02T06:04:23.552-04:00Comments on Back to the Drawing Board: Respecting the Rich Victim: Boundary Crossings and Critical OpportunitiesDannyhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14933199894935324897noreply@blogger.comBlogger6125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2473166537823294555.post-4434410201886892442008-12-07T16:12:00.000-05:002008-12-07T16:12:00.000-05:00Well the thing is, I'm not directly concerned here...Well the thing is, I'm not directly concerned here with coming up with a way that society should deal with these kinds of problems (I discussed this at the end of the paper). The question is what Jerry ought to do, given the way that he understands the situation. By this standard, Jerry's wrongness has nothing to do with a punishment he receives, or Lucy's decision regarding what she wants to do about the situation. The question is whether Jerry's breaking into Lucy's house would disrespect Lucy's individuality and inherent moral worth.<BR/><BR/>As for the rigidity that you claim is necessary to work with notions of rights, I'm not sure I agree. Since you just sort of assert your position, I'm not entirely sure why you think that. I've laid out my basic way of approaching rights-oriented issues in <A HREF="http://libertarian-left.blogspot.com/2008/04/rights-and-entitlements.html" REL="nofollow">this post</A>; I think it's a much more appropriate way of thinking than the more rigid structures.Dannyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14933199894935324897noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2473166537823294555.post-35027353984385178602008-12-07T03:09:00.000-05:002008-12-07T03:09:00.000-05:00You believe that the appropriate thing for the chi...<I>You believe that the appropriate thing for the child to do would be to simply sit down and die? Most people disagree.</I><BR/><BR/>I made no argument about what she should or should not do, simply that I would be uncomfortable associating with her after her theft. This is simply an empirical fact. <BR/><BR/>So ideally she should get someone else to steal it for her and receive it in ignorance. <BR/><BR/>In general, rather than adding epicycles, I still prefer to say that moral right and wrong are never the only criterion against which we should judge actions. <BR/><BR/>Because right and wrong cannot be approached in a way analogous to physics, it needs rigid logical structure. Getting fuzzy around the edges doesn't seem like a good strategy, though I can't prove it right now. <BR/><BR/>But regarding the window. <BR/><BR/>Imagine a financially analogous situation. Instead of Lucy's window, my birdfeeder. <BR/><BR/>I can't imagine feeling anything other than annoyance. I certainly won't go to the court system. <BR/><BR/>However, for the argument to remain in force, Lucy must want to press charges, as otherwise the argument simply goes,<BR/><BR/>"Jerry may be in the wrong for smashing the window, but it doesn't matter as he'll never be punished for it. He can apologize to Lucy if he wishes." <BR/><BR/>And as such Lucy feels significantly harmed, regardless of what happens to her balance sheet. <BR/><BR/>This is most likely because if Jerry can smash due to life-altering circumstances, then there's going to be a lot of bona fide criminals who suddenly claim that their crimes were also due to life-altering circumstances, and now you have to prove them all liars.Alrenoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11119846531341190283noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2473166537823294555.post-65931512382657670492008-12-06T12:09:00.000-05:002008-12-06T12:09:00.000-05:00Jeepers; looks like I totally forgot to respond to...Jeepers; looks like I totally forgot to respond to the two previous commenters...sorry guys! I'll try to get around to that soon...<BR/><BR/>Alrenous, I think the answer to some of your confusion is actually contained in your comment. You ask, "Indeed, the aristocrat doesn't value the drug very much. But if so, why aren't they consenting? Either they value the child's life even less, or to consent would be to violate a principle which they do value highly." Thomson (it's a she) has the former reason in mind: the aristocrat simply does not care about the child, as you pointed out.<BR/><BR/>As I attempt to tease out in my essay, there's a tension between the idea that the aristocrat doesn't care what happens to the child, and the idea that we should nevertheless respect his title to the drug. If libertarian conceptions of rights are built on the foundation of recognizing the value in others, then it would seem odd for the aristocrat to demand that people respect the importance of his title to the drug, while simultaneously ignoring the importance of the child's plight. On one hand, he would be acting as if he thought that people had no duty to be concerned with others' interests, and on the other hand, he would be saying that people should be concerned with his. As I see it, the aristocrat would be something of a hypocrite.<BR/><BR/>Now, you point out that you would feel disregard towards the child for stealing the drug, but I find this somewhat surprising. You believe that the appropriate thing for the child to do would be to simply sit down and die? Most people disagree.<BR/><BR/>I do agree somewhat with your point about needing to find extreme situations to justify boundary crossings, and I personally don't find this result surprising. I would expect to find that under normal circumstances, it would be best to honor others' rights. I mean, keep in mind that in the theory from which I'm departing, people are supposed to honor rights in <I>every</I> situation!Dannyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14933199894935324897noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2473166537823294555.post-28179628721720086162008-12-05T17:49:00.000-05:002008-12-05T17:49:00.000-05:00I'm going to have to argue against Thomson, becaus...I'm going to have to argue against Thomson, because I find his logic outrageously bad.<BR/><BR/>You don't much value the drug, yet you are refusing consent regardless. This doesn't make any sense, and is clearly not meant as a logical statement, but as a reaction against aristocrats. <BR/><BR/>Indeed, the aristocrat doesn't value the drug very much. But if so, why aren't they consenting? Either they value the child's life even less, or to consent would be to violate a principle which they <I>do</I> value highly.<BR/><BR/>In the first case, it's quite pointless to make an argument that they're disrespecting the child's anything. (It doesn't matter.) They're perfectly aware and perfectly apathetic. In the second, the argument misses the point. <BR/><BR/>Thomson should stick to rhetoric. <BR/><BR/><I> And if the child stole the drug, would you feel disdain for her blatant disregard for the man? I think not.</I><BR/><BR/>I most certainly would, though it would be mixed with my disregard for the aristocrat as well.<BR/><BR/>Returning to the window-smashing example, as the enthusiasm-valuing employer,* were I to find out;<BR/><BR/>*(A policy which badly backfired, as has been shown.)<BR/><BR/>"You smashed a window to get to a phone? Now that's enthusiasm! But I don't want to hire you anymore."<BR/><BR/>The employer would see this as a sign of further antisocial tendencies, and quite rationally take someone else. <BR/><BR/>Boundary crossing, technically the origin of the word trespass, (for big step), is not condonable precisely because you must create such contrived instances to expose any kind of weakness. No healthy society will ever run into these difficulties, because both phones and medicine will have multiple sources.<BR/><BR/>These arguments show more that monopolies are evil than that trespass should be allowed.Alrenoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11119846531341190283noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2473166537823294555.post-22017176814233728712008-08-26T21:28:00.000-04:002008-08-26T21:28:00.000-04:00You may want to make two distinctions here: first,...You may want to make two distinctions here: first, between political ethics and ethics in general; second, between rule and act utilitarianisms. Political ethics deals with proper uses of violence. The first distinction thus implies that you may perhaps have a <I>moral</I> right to smash the window or to steal the drug, but you don't have the <I>legal</I> right to do so. A judge would have no choice but to punish you for damaging property or theft even beyond merely ordering restitution even if you feel morally justified.<BR/><BR/>The second distinction implies that the <I>rules</I> following which normally secures the most happiness can in certain circumstances be violated in order to serve utilitarianism directly, that is, in the interest of <I>act</I> utilitarianism. Thus, it would be in order to maximize total utility (however aggregated) that the normally admirable rule to respect property rights might be set aside in order to save the child while harming the drugs owner only a little. Are such calculations invalid? Well, I agree with your piece on interpersonal utility comparisons that these can be made in a crude fashion.<BR/><BR/>So, these are dilemmas, and you would feel guilty no matter what you did. But the point is to make the best choice as you feel it and live with the guilt.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2473166537823294555.post-67872916869347722862008-05-16T19:09:00.000-04:002008-05-16T19:09:00.000-04:00Since I didn't think it appropriate to leave a tre...Since I didn't think it appropriate to leave a treatise here, I replied to this on my forum at http://www.anarchyisnotchaos.net/forum/showthread.php?tid=7&pid=15#pid15<BR/><BR/>Hopefully you'll like my answer. It's not as vague, to my way of thinking, as your article presumes.Kevin K. Biomechhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05489537057051672719noreply@blogger.com