tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2473166537823294555.post3086306375937296097..comments2023-11-02T06:04:23.552-04:00Comments on Back to the Drawing Board: Rights and EntitlementsDannyhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14933199894935324897noreply@blogger.comBlogger6125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2473166537823294555.post-27383429509816749232011-09-09T15:59:40.448-04:002011-09-09T15:59:40.448-04:00Then, as I shall say, we infringe his right. But I...Then, as I shall say, we infringe his right. But I shall say that we violate his right if and only if we do not merely infringe his right, but more, are acting wrongly, unjustly in doing so would be to take my life, it would surely be permissible for you to do so.pharmacyhttp://www.quickestpharmacy.com/noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2473166537823294555.post-35895466580474441762008-04-22T12:22:00.000-04:002008-04-22T12:22:00.000-04:00Perhaps it would help to think of rights as identi...Perhaps it would help to think of rights as identifying things that would be <I>prima facie</I> wrong. So it's not that rights do no work, it's just that to have a right does not <I>always</I> mean that someone would be wrong to infringe it.Danny Shaharhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16781136797017833336noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2473166537823294555.post-35747473857305293622008-04-22T11:48:00.000-04:002008-04-22T11:48:00.000-04:00With respect to Judith Thomson, I don't think her ...With respect to Judith Thomson, I don't think her wording expressed anything that yours did not, although she provides more detail. Ultimately you are both using moral vocabulary (e.g. "acting wrongly, unjustly") to describe what a right is. If a theory of rights depends on another method of knowing what is, for example, right or wrong, then it has no moral explanatory power by itself. That is, you can't say "Action X is wrong because it infringes on someone's rights", if you can only know that it infringes on their rights by previously determining that it is wrong/unjust.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2473166537823294555.post-81237709644385929362008-04-22T11:23:00.000-04:002008-04-22T11:23:00.000-04:00Thanks for the critiques! I forgot to point out t...Thanks for the critiques! I forgot to point out that this is a part of the introductory section of my thesis on climate change, and I guess it doesn't do as well as I might have liked as a stand-alone article. To see where I was going with this, the next two paragraphs tentatively read like this:<BR/><BR/>The idea that we can be justified in infringing others’ rights can be captured in a bit of terminology which I will borrow from Judith Thomson. She writes:<BR/>"Suppose a man has a right that something or other shall be the case; let us say that he has a right that p, where p is some statement or other, and now suppose we make p false. So, for example, if his right is that he is not punched in the nose, we make that false, that is, we bring about that he is punched in the nose. Then, as I shall say, we infringe his right. But I shall say that we violate his right if and only if we do not merely infringe his right, but more, are acting wrongly, unjustly in doing so."<BR/><BR/>In looking for an appropriate libertarian response to climate change, this distinction will be critical. Most libertarians presume that we have a right to self-determination, such that we are generally entitled to do as we please. The most uncontroversially legitimate reason for infringing upon this right is that an individual has acted unjustly by violating the rights of others. Accordingly, our first task will be to establish whether climate change infringes any rights possessed by those who will be affected by its impacts. We will then discuss whether these infringements represent an injustice, or whether they represent permissible actions on the part of those contributing to climate change. Lastly, we will discuss whether there might be reasons for coercively interfering with individuals’ right to self-determination besides the violation of others’ rights.Danny Shaharhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16781136797017833336noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2473166537823294555.post-79502552445012624162008-04-22T07:55:00.000-04:002008-04-22T07:55:00.000-04:00But what, exactly, does it mean to have a right? Y...But what, exactly, does it mean to have a right? You started to touch on that issue, but then you moved onto an examination of what rights a person has. You wrote:<BR/><BR/><I>The simplest conception of rights argues that to have the right to something is to be entitled to it, so that its absence constitutes a rights-violation. </I><BR/><BR/>I think you have to do better than that in order for this to be persuasive. Since rights and entitlement are effectively synonymous, the above sentence has no real explanatory power. What does it mean to be entitled, obligated, etc.? What is a rights-violation? It seems that, in order to really say something about the subject, it has to be discussed without simply using other moral vocabulary.<BR/><BR/>The rest of the essay could be interesting, but it looks like you got there too early. You're implicitly relying on intuition as a method for validating moral propositions. If you're going to take that approach, then the argument would be more persuasive if it was explicitly addressed.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2473166537823294555.post-23243238146011139442008-04-22T02:59:00.000-04:002008-04-22T02:59:00.000-04:00What about conflicting rights? Your last paragraph...What about conflicting rights? Your last paragraph seems to want this question...<BR/><BR/>And also: "to have a right to something is closest to being entitled not to be deprived of it by others in the absence of certain kinds of morally significant reasons for doing so"<BR/><BR/>Aren't the 'certain kinds of reasons' required for making this statement meaningful?<BR/><BR/>-Alex from Liberating MindsUnknownhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15601231548870804375noreply@blogger.com