tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2473166537823294555.post6730488091600630430..comments2023-11-02T06:04:23.552-04:00Comments on Back to the Drawing Board: On Leviathan and Public Reason: A Reply to ChartierDannyhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14933199894935324897noreply@blogger.comBlogger2125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2473166537823294555.post-40339902631288749802009-07-04T10:49:08.742-04:002009-07-04T10:49:08.742-04:00Thanks so much for dropping by!
I guess the probl...Thanks so much for dropping by!<br /><br />I guess the problem I'm seeing is that the concept of a "minimal state" has a lot of baggage which the Hobbesian may or may not be okay with. This is because typically, conceptions of the minimal state are based on a distinctly Lockean view of the natural law which is a lot broader and more comprehensive than Hobbes' conception of the natural law. To Locke, the nature of the social contract is going to be more or less spelled out by his view that people "may not, unless it be to do justice on an offender, take away, or impair the life, or what tends to the preservation of the life, the liberty, health, limb, or goods of another." The minimal state simply enforces this natural law.<br /><br />But to Hobbes, the law of nature is fundamentally different, and a lot less settled. He writes, "where no Covenant hath preceded, there hath no Right been transferred, and every man has right to every thing; and consequently, no action can be Unjust. But when a Covenant is made, then to break it is Unjust: And the definition of Injustice, is no other than the not Performance of Covenant. And whatsoever is not Unjust, is Just." In Hobbes' view, the nature of the social contract is very much up in the air; the main thing that's important is that it's a contract, and therefore we have reason to stick with it. <br /><br />When we try to determine the exact nature of the contract, Hobbes thinks that insofar as we all rely on our private reasons, we'll never arrive at an agreeable solution. The reason that he wants leviathan in the first place is the same reason that he would be skeptical of the Lockean system: he doesn't seem to think there can be a system of government that can be independently justified, and so we need to simply submit to the (arbitrary?) will of a third party. The problem with the minimal state for the Hobbesian, then, is going to be that it keeps the peace in a very particular way, and he may or may not find this acceptable. The minimal state would arguably be just as legitimate as the fascist state, the socialistic state, etc. And to try to choose between these ourselves would be to attempt to criticize the sovereign, which is a no-no for Hobbes since it's only by treating the sovereign as a source of public reason that we get out of the state of war in the first place.<br /><br />Obviously, neither of us are going to be convinced by this. But I do think that if you're going to reject it, then you have to actually reject it: without this element, we're really no longer talking about Hobbes' position.Dannyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14933199894935324897noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2473166537823294555.post-2984999377563723212009-07-04T09:51:59.873-04:002009-07-04T09:51:59.873-04:00Thanks for continuing to take the time to think ab...Thanks for continuing to take the time to think about this with me, Danny.<br /><br />Basically, I think you're being a careful reader of Hobbes and I'm focusing on an idealized Hobbesian position. I'd define the latter as a position in accordance with which we need the state because without it we're likely to kill each other—we're likely to find ourselves perpetually engaged in “the war of all against all,” with lives that are, whether or not solitary or poor, at least are likely to be nasty, brutish, and short.<br /><br />My guess is that, even among people who know little or nothing about Hobbes, this is the underlying motivation for much practical statism. People don't want to be at war with each other; they want someone to resolve disputes and suppress violence. By slowly stripping away elements of the state, I seek to show that it's not the state that's needed to do <i>this</i>.<br /><br />I framed this as a challenge to the Hobbesian, because I was focused on the kind of institution needed to prevent violence. As I suggested before, I see you as offering two objections to the position I've laid out.<br /><br />1. Hobbes really wants to say a good deal more than this.<br /><br />2. Bracketing the exegetical question, the Hobbesian will have a substantive objection to my claim that the kind of state needed, given the assumptions of Hobbes's own argument, to prevent the war of all against all is a minimal state.<br /><br />As regards #1, I don't claim to be engaged in the exegesis of Hobbes, so I have no reason to dispute your reading.<br /><br />As regards #2, it seems to me that the war of all against all can be prevented as long as people are required to keep agreements and to avoid killing each other. You suggest that the Hobbesian (bracket Hobbes himself here) believes that the state needs more-than-minimal authority <i>precisely to achieve this goal</i>, and therefore won't be willing to move along the conceptual slide I've suggested. Since I don't want to run out of space any more than you did, I'll simply observe that I'm not convinced: I think the most the argument need be thought to entail is an entity capable of protecting people from violence and enforcing agreements.<br /><br />Do you think more than this follow's from the Hobbesian's perspective (not Hobbes's)? What assumptions require it?Gary Chartierhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05687278491211390956noreply@blogger.com