tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2473166537823294555.post6870379201373895655..comments2023-11-02T06:04:23.552-04:00Comments on Back to the Drawing Board: Moderate Holism and Methodological Individualism: Towards a ReconciliationDannyhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14933199894935324897noreply@blogger.comBlogger10125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2473166537823294555.post-50822648476023383152008-12-14T11:20:00.000-05:002008-12-14T11:20:00.000-05:00JEK (from earlier), I think it's actually one of t...JEK (from earlier), I think it's actually one of the noteworthy features of Rand's writing that she breaks down holistic concepts into claims about individuals in order to make them seem mistaken and even evil. That's not by accident; Rand believed very strongly that if people understood these things "as they really are," then they would see why they were so wrong. <A HREF="http://libertarian-left.blogspot.com/2008/10/you-tell-em-jan.html" REL="nofollow">In another post</A>, I highlight Jan Narveson more explicitly doing the same thing.<BR/><BR/>But the fact that some holistic concepts can be explained in terms of individuals does not mean that <I>all</I> holistic claims can be explained that way. Good candidates for individualistic decomposition are those concepts which refer to a leader's decisions as "the group's decisions," and spontaneous orders not characterized by conscious grouping. But some things (I believe hockey is an example) are not as amenable to this sort of decomposition. The hockey team is it's own thing (even if there is no hockey team that exists independently of its parts) just like a person is not exactly the same thing as a set of cells connected in a particular way.Dannyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14933199894935324897noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2473166537823294555.post-15707730658083252082008-12-14T11:09:00.000-05:002008-12-14T11:09:00.000-05:00Just to nitpick on your first point, doesn't your ...Just to nitpick on your first point, doesn't your will control your body? That is, doesn't it affect change by use of bodily faculties? Or are you characterizing the "will" as the passive, emotive "part" of the self, whereas the "intellect" is the deliberative, active "part" of the self? If so, are you willing to acknowledge that you're drawing a hard distinction where in actuality there's a fuzzy continuum?<BR/><BR/>More substantively, I don't think your account of the different sorts of good is exactly right. First, I don't believe that there is such a thing as an "objective" good in exactly the way that you characterized it. I do, however, believe that the attribution of value to things involves an objective component. That is, we recognize objective features in objects and either "undeliberatively" value them (instinctively? automatically?), or we actively choose to value them as a sort of means to some end. It seems to me that the "objective" valuation you describe would be comprehensible within my paradigm as the sort of valuation that's reactive and undeliberative.<BR/><BR/>But if that sort of reaction is "objective," then it seems to me that moral rules might have a very strong claim to being at least somewhat objective in that sense. For example, I think we attach negative value to pain in others without choosing to do so; we know that pain is bad, and we acknowledge its badness automatically when we see it. Because we recognize that others experience life in much the same way that we do, and because we know that we (I think automatically) ascribe some moral weight to pain when inflicted upon us, I think we more or less undeliberatively ascribe moral weight to pain in others. That's why "You shouldn't hurt other people for no reason" is not a position most of us choose to accept; it's something we view to be common sense.<BR/><BR/>This view of moral prescriptions as at least partly reactive is supported by the fact that most cultures agree on a great many norms, and the fact that where there are disagreements, we can often find differences in the way people view the metaphysical nature of the objects of their disagreements. To use the classic example of Hindus and cows, we see that the disagreement over whether eating cows is okay stems from the belief that ancestors' souls reside in cows bodies; if people from other cultures actually believed that this were true, it seems likely that they would believe the same thing as the Hindus about eating cows.<BR/><BR/>This view is also bolstered by the fact that when we disagree with others about moral issues, we don't speak autobiographically, but rather point to objective features in objects of moral concern as grounding our views, and contradicting our opponent's. That is, I don't say, "You shouldn't step on the cat because I decided that I like cats, and that I wouldn't like to step on them anymore!" Rather, you point to the fact that it hurts the cat when you step on it, and hurting the cat for no reason is morally bad. The implication here is that you think that there's something about hurting the cat for no reason that would make any normal human being realize that it was wrong.<BR/><BR/>If that's true, then morality would not simply be dependent on agreement between individuals (implying that if individuals did not agree, that would be the end of the discussion). It would also reflect the objective component in moral sensibility which tends to produce agreement on moral issues.<BR/><BR/>While I don't think that social moral norms are the same kind of thing as hockey (hockey is not the product of normative reactions), I do think that the nature of hockey is similarly not entirely dependent on what people think. If you believed that hockey is played in the water, and I believed it is played on ice, it wouldn't simply be an irreconcilable disagreement, or something that I would need to settle by appealing to what other people happen to think. You would simply be wrong; hockey just isn't played in the water. To put it another way, hockey in the water is not hockey (it's water polo, more or less :-P). If I turned on an Islanders game and said, "See? Hockey." You could not legitimately say, "Oh, well that's not what I think of as hockey."Dannyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14933199894935324897noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2473166537823294555.post-18168823102330462922008-12-14T03:15:00.000-05:002008-12-14T03:15:00.000-05:00This comment has been removed by the author.Jonatan Krovitskyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03755263917070708938noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2473166537823294555.post-25713582967945331622008-12-14T02:31:00.000-05:002008-12-14T02:31:00.000-05:00Dmitry, can you rephrase it without useage of Chri...Dmitry, can you rephrase it without useage of Christian metaphores? "Trace of Trinity" associated in my world with overdose.Jonatan Krovitskyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03755263917070708938noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2473166537823294555.post-49764554509506180442008-12-12T19:26:00.000-05:002008-12-12T19:26:00.000-05:00Here is an example. Your will is a subjective facu...Here is an example. Your <I>will</I> is a subjective faculty, because it is affected by objects outside of itself. You see a thing, and that thing, an object, causes the will to desire it if the object is not possessed or to rejoice in it if the object is possessed. The will does not act but is acted upon.<BR/><BR/>Your <I>body</I> is an objective faculty, in that it pushes particles of matter around. With your body's help you impose on things. You are the master; you are in control. You act.<BR/><BR/>Your <I>intellect</I>, finally, is an inter-subjective faculty, in that it is used, fundamentally, in conversations with other minds. It is not the objective pushy body, nor the subjective soft will, but occupies a place in between: it is persuasive, it uses words to change people's beliefs (and your own) and so has a kind of power, but it's not the "coercive" power that bodies have. Further, the intellect conceives plans of action, and therefore mediates the desires of the will and human actions.<BR/><BR/>Here is another example. The world of matter-and-energy is fundamentally different from the world of human experience and inner life. That's why the methodologies of physics and economics are so different: they apply to different realities. Things are <I>objects</I>; humans are <I>subjects</I>; though there is a mechanical aspect to us, we are ultimately spirits: contra, say, Ray Kurzweil, we are not "spiritual machines" but "machine-like spirits." Inter-subjectivity manifests itself in (1) the life of the intellect and (2) social life.<BR/><BR/>And yet another. There are three kinds of good and evil: metaphysical, moral, and physical. Physical good is purely subjective, i.e., something is a good, because I value it, because it brings happiness to me, and that's that. I first value something, and then and because of it, it becomes good. Metaphysical good is objective, so first something is good, and then I had better value it (or else). Moral good is in between, inter-subjective, deriving its character from agreement by rational agents. All human law is inter-subjective. All natural law is inter-subjective, as well. Even in the case of a person on a deserted island, there is a law governing what he can do to himself. Perhaps we can say that there is a trace of the Trinity within all of us, and so even relations with oneself are inter-subjective. I'll always remember Eric Hoffer's mention of "communion with oneself."<BR/><BR/>To clarify: Socrates is better than a pig metaphysically; adult and virtuous Socrates is better than infant or vicious Socrates morally; and Socrates satisfied is better than Socrates dissatisfied physically. Thus, metaphysical good does not need a soul in order to be good, physical good requires a soul in order to be good, and moral good is the result of a soul judging itself.<BR/><BR/>A final example. Suppose A meets B for the first time "in the state of nature." He may decide to treat B as a thing. But, if he is smart, he will recognize B's nature and consider him a subject, like himself. But at this point A still has no idea how to behave towards B. What must happen first is a <I>conversation</I> between them, to understand each other's desires and desirable traits. Only once they have become familiar with each other can they establish rules on how to act.<BR/><BR/>See also:<BR/><BR/><A HREF="http://dmitrychernikov.com/blog/2007/10/17/morality-is-intersubjective/" REL="nofollow">Morality Is Intersubjective</A><BR/><A HREF="http://dmitrychernikov.com/blog/2008/09/15/goods/" REL="nofollow">Goods</A>Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2473166537823294555.post-42615305378594956202008-12-11T04:56:00.000-05:002008-12-11T04:56:00.000-05:00I've reread Rand lately when I noticed somthing in...I've reread Rand lately when I noticed somthing intresting. In his finak major speach in front of Keating, Toohey presenting his socialist vision... still uses Methodological Individualism!<BR/>"The world of the future. The world I want. A world of obedience and of unity. A world where the thought of each man will not be his own, but an attempt to guess the thought of the brain of his neighbor who’ll have no thought of his own but an attempt to guess the thought of the next neighbor who’ll have no thought--and so on, Peter,around the globe."<BR/><BR/>Trying to describe society after accepting the methodological individualism is a tricky project. <BR/>I went to Toohey, because I held that as long as people consider a "Society" to exist (as they consider "the state" and "the market"), it exists as a factor it their own conduct. But Rand chops it back down to individuals. <BR/>In your case, should the team members have a notion what <BR/>"hockey team" is, then the "team" would exist independent of any given team memeber. <BR/>On other hand it may be just an example of Micro- Macro perspective (Beg oyu to find a name for it). Any time you change perspective from Micro to Macro, andy given single quantum looses value. speed and direction of single air molecule in given volume of air can be random, but the whole volume has specific temperature. A single market participant holds no power over the market, but the market created by all the paticipants. In that case, perhaps, we can present society as a whole witjout refting the Metodological IndividualismJonatan Krovitskyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03755263917070708938noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2473166537823294555.post-14858662759402331602008-12-10T20:16:00.000-05:002008-12-10T20:16:00.000-05:00I've never been exposed to the term before; would ...I've never been exposed to the term before; would something like the common law be inter-subjective? What distinguishes "inter-subjective" things from "subjective" things?Dannyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14933199894935324897noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2473166537823294555.post-33589625080604408172008-12-10T19:11:00.000-05:002008-12-10T19:11:00.000-05:00Danny, if something is neither subjective nor obje...Danny, if something is neither subjective nor objective, then it must be inter-subjective. These pretty much cover all possibilities.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2473166537823294555.post-63287300283165381152008-12-09T23:40:00.000-05:002008-12-09T23:40:00.000-05:00That's why I put scare quotes around the word "obj...That's why I put scare quotes around the word "objective." I'm not sure exactly what word to use; I don't think intersubjective is correct. I almost think "institutional" might work? The point is that it's not merely what a bunch of people agree to call hockey. <BR/><BR/>It's true that if everyone agreed to call baseball "hockey," then baseball would be "hockey." Obviously, "hockey" is only a concept that exists within minds; if a different concept existed in its stead, then that would be that. But the concept of hockey is not simply a statistical notion making reference to what a majority believes. Again, it may be true that if the statistics were different, we would have a weaker case for our definition of "hockey." But I take it that the correct account of the nature of hockey does not make reference to such a statistical phenomenon.<BR/><BR/>When you make reference to "those who have been authorized to draft the rules," I'm more intrigued. It seems like this might be a more fair account of the true nature of hockey, but the question presents itself: What do you mean by "those who have been authorized to draft the rules"? Authorized by who? The rules for what? Could they fail at the task with which they were charged? Doesn't this explanation fit much more cleanly into the idea of a social institution than into a reductionist framework making reference only to individuals?<BR/><BR/>As for your last point about player utility, that's basically what I said; were you objecting to something?Dannyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14933199894935324897noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2473166537823294555.post-89799865484748304892008-12-09T23:00:00.000-05:002008-12-09T23:00:00.000-05:00Rules of hockey are not objective but inter-subjec...Rules of hockey are not objective but inter-subjective. They are between subjects, depending for their existence of agreement, conformity of the subjects to one another, mutual understanding.<BR/><BR/>To play hockey incorrectly means to defy the expectations of the majority (or some amount whose reaction to incorrect playing will have significant consequences) of the spectators or of those who have been authorized to draft the rules.<BR/><BR/>Players derive utility from being on the team with high position in the standings.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.com