tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2473166537823294555.post4320475565121866808..comments2023-11-02T06:04:23.552-04:00Comments on Back to the Drawing Board: Assorted Responses to Callahan on Value TheoryDannyhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14933199894935324897noreply@blogger.comBlogger32125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2473166537823294555.post-52148827332753518062009-06-08T04:28:12.563-04:002009-06-08T04:28:12.563-04:00Hippo, I've created a blog entry in response h...Hippo, I've created a blog entry in response <a href="http://stanr.posterous.com/reply-to-hippo-on-the-science-of-morality" rel="nofollow">here</a>.Stanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07658169777531617812noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2473166537823294555.post-30307366444034879462009-05-31T16:52:52.277-04:002009-05-31T16:52:52.277-04:00"We think in fiction, aka metaphors. Now, applied ...<I>"We think in fiction, aka metaphors. Now, applied to thinking about morality: you held a fiction about intrinsic, real moral value, puzzled it out with us, and are now dissatisfied with the loss. The sense of loss, or dissatisfaction, results from a truth-value equivalence error. When you talk about "pretending" and "deceiving," you're revealing an underlying language of value. Consider: we could call using metaphor "deception." Metaphors are abstracted, misleading things. We could also admit that metaphor is the only way we could actually arrange our perceptions into chunks for manipulation. Aka, thinking. So if Morality doesn't "make sense" except as fiction, why does that bother you? (As it bothered me, btw.)""</I>This doesn't describe me in my present state, although perhaps some reservations still exist from my loss years ago when I rejected Christianity around the age of 17 and lost any basis for a certain variety of Morality that I had held. What bothers me at present is that we allow for a 'metaphor' to <I>logically justify</I> our moral conclusions because we can't find anything better. In other words as I understand the process: <br /><br />1: I hold some subjective value (e.g. it is wrong to murder).<br />2: But this really just means "I don't like it when people are killed in certain ways."<br />3: If I were to try to use this subjective view of morality to come to other moral conclusions it fails to function as intended.<br />C: Therefore: We need to use the fiction from (1) (e.g. it is wrong to murder) in order to speak cogently about morality.<br /><br /><I>"The problem occurs when you swap camera views (1st to 3rd person obj), but invariably take a little of the other view along. You make value judgments in objective space even though objective space is purely descriptive, and value judgments should be made only in subjective space. You can't help it, though, because you're not actually in objective space, you're in a virtual objective space. You're creating a metaphorical abstraction of objectivity. You create maps of the terrain. They are snapshots of possibly valid and sound objectivity, sorted and assigned value based on how valid or sound they seem to be. In other words, you value your objective snapshots by how true they seem.* In your objective, should-be-descriptive analysis of human behavior, "value-creep" occurs. Fiction you observe being held as truth by people is devalued, because it is fiction. Further, you were hoping Morality wasn't fiction, because you knew that would devalues it for you. At least, that is how I interpret you trying to find something that can't be. <B>The irony for us: we may "know" that truth is not the same as value, but when thinking, we can't help "feeling" they're equivalent."</B></I>I think I follow you. What I am after is truth and honesty in our portrayal of moral ideas and our actions pursuant to them. If we admit that a person subjectively creates all values and that they do not really lie in objective space, why do we pretend they do - so we can use logical propositions to defend and explain them? The whole process is one of knowingly misusing the tools at our disposal. I want to throw away the metaphor and see what is left.Radical Hippohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11451555491453650730noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2473166537823294555.post-24298079514728263622009-05-30T05:22:54.652-04:002009-05-30T05:22:54.652-04:00What I'm trying to find is something about the wor...<I>What I'm trying to find is something about the world besides a fictional account of right and wrong to justify our moral ideas and the actions that result from these ideas.<br /></I> - <br /><br />If you're looking for some inherent "rightness" outside of cooperative heuristics, I agree with Danny's response, excluding his last paragraph. You don't need to justify. I'd say it's natural to be uncomfortable with moral skepticism at first. I think you've made what I call a "truth-value equivalence error." We can't help it, and I'll try to explain why, and what it is.<br /><br />In the following, I'll use "you" for convenience, but it applies to any of us; I'm not accusing you of anything I wouldn't admit doing myself. <br /><br />We think in fiction, aka metaphors. Now, applied to thinking about morality: you held a fiction about intrinsic, real moral value, puzzled it out with us, and are now dissatisfied with the loss. The sense of loss, or dissatisfaction, results from a truth-value equivalence error. When you talk about "pretending" and "deceiving," you're revealing an underlying language of value. Consider: we could call using metaphor "deception." Metaphors are abstracted, misleading things. We could also admit that metaphor is the only way we could actually arrange our perceptions into chunks for manipulation. Aka, thinking. So if Morality doesn't "make sense" except as fiction, why does that bother you? (As it bothered me, btw.)<br /><br />The problem occurs when you swap camera views (1st to 3rd person obj), but invariably take a little of the other view along. You make value judgments in objective space even though objective space is purely descriptive, and value judgments should be made only in subjective space. You can't help it, though, because you're not actually in objective space, you're in a virtual objective space. You're creating a metaphorical abstraction of objectivity. You create maps of the terrain. They are snapshots of possibly valid and sound objectivity, sorted and assigned value based on how valid or sound they seem to be. In other words, you value your objective snapshots by how true they seem.* In your objective, should-be-descriptive analysis of human behavior, "value-creep" occurs. Fiction you observe being held as truth by people is devalued, because it is fiction. Further, you were hoping Morality wasn't fiction, because you knew that would devalues it for you. At least, that is how I interpret you trying to find something that can't be. The irony for us: we may "know" that truth is not the same as value, but when thinking, we can't help "feeling" they're equivalent.<br /><br />So, if what I said made any sense at all, and you're now aware of the value-creep, you have to consider whether you should continue to be dissatisfied by something that is a hallucinatory side-effect of reasoning--as a human being, and with the only equipment available to you--about why we human beings do things.<br /><br />Morality's a very touchy area, because while we may want the metaphor to be real, we don't have to abandon the cooperative heuristics if we admit it's fiction. That's why I posted here to attempt to explain--<A HREF="http://libertarian-left.blogspot.com/2009/05/why-fictionalism-reply-to-stan.html" REL="nofollow">badly, I might add, given the results</A>--a reasonable and scientific approach to combine the strengths and weaknesses of Danny and Vichy's positions, while sloughing off the less functional bits.<br /><br />*I'm simplifying. Plenty of room for cognitive bias, but, assuming you're in "system 2" reasoning mode, you're attempting to sort by truth.Stanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07658169777531617812noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2473166537823294555.post-84729032382588444412009-05-29T19:34:59.580-04:002009-05-29T19:34:59.580-04:00But so what I'm saying is that you have to provide...But so what I'm saying is that you have to provide a reason to think that they are both true. I agree that 2+2=4 as a matter of objective fact, and I don't think I ever said that value can't be objective <EM>because it isn't material</EM>. I just said that it's not clear what it would mean for something to be valuable outside of alluding to some statement or counterfactual about how evaluating minds do or would evaluate the thing.Dannyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14933199894935324897noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2473166537823294555.post-28759521344672936892009-05-29T19:29:42.248-04:002009-05-29T19:29:42.248-04:00Hmm...the formatting seems to be off... Let me tr...Hmm...the formatting seems to be off... Let me try that again:<br /><br />Just to clarify, I said:<br /><br /><EM>1) Value is a mental phenomenon which proceeds from evaluation (conscious or unconscious); without evaluating minds it would be incoherent to speak of value.</EM>~<br />And you said:<br /><br /><EM>Yes, Dan, #1 is certainly wrong, just as it is true that, without mathematicians, 2 + 2 would still equal 4.</EM>~<br />And I took that to mean exactly what you claim to never have said:<br /><br /><EM>Secondly, I never said "It's JUST LIKE 2 + 2 = 4."</EM>~<br />You at least have to admit it sounds a little like that's what you were saying!Dannyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14933199894935324897noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2473166537823294555.post-87942395262560367352009-05-29T19:28:57.519-04:002009-05-29T19:28:57.519-04:00Well, they are alike in they are both true! (They ...Well, they are alike in they are both true! (They are both examples of non-material things about which there is an objective truth.) That, of course, does not mean they are alike in every, or, indeed, even any other way.gcallahhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10065877215969589482noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2473166537823294555.post-48337536192384666862009-05-29T19:26:21.436-04:002009-05-29T19:26:21.436-04:00Just to clarify, I said:
1) Value is a mental phe...Just to clarify, I said:<br /><br /><EM>1) Value is a mental phenomenon which proceeds from evaluation (conscious or unconscious); without evaluating minds it would be incoherent to speak of value.</EM>And you said:<br /><br /><EM>Yes, Dan, #1 is certainly wrong, just as it is true that, without mathematicians, 2 + 2 would still equal 4.</EM>And I took that to mean exactly what you claim to never have said:<br /><br /><EM>Secondly, I never said "It's JUST LIKE 2 + 2 = 4."</EM>You at least have to admit it sounds a <EM>little</EM> like that's what you were saying!Dannyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14933199894935324897noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2473166537823294555.post-38322902732574562722009-05-29T19:21:37.073-04:002009-05-29T19:21:37.073-04:00Haha but I don't think I ever said that non-materi...Haha but I don't think I ever said that non-material things can't exist; is there a particular quotation you had in mind?<br /><br />(If I'm slow in responding, it's 'cause I'm leaving for an IHS seminar in North Carolina tonight)Dannyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14933199894935324897noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2473166537823294555.post-57637167015749092722009-05-29T19:19:46.605-04:002009-05-29T19:19:46.605-04:00No one (that I know of) ever said that analytical ...No one (that I know of) ever said that analytical reasoning is impossible! But you ought to figure this out -- you can't get political philosophy right unless you first get philosophy in general right!<br /><br />Secondly, I never said "It's JUST LIKE 2 + 2 = 4."<br /><br />I gave that as an example of something non-material that is objectively true, a class you seemed to be asserting is empty.<br /><br />To discuss these sorts of things, I think it's important not to attribute arguments to one's discussion partner that that person never made!gcallahhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10065877215969589482noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2473166537823294555.post-47574092510780280192009-05-29T13:00:52.737-04:002009-05-29T13:00:52.737-04:00"Well yeah. Who doesn't like Queen?"
Communists, ..."Well yeah. Who doesn't like Queen?"<br /><br />Communists, Hippo. Communists.Dannyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14933199894935324897noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2473166537823294555.post-9204442797450609762009-05-29T13:00:13.687-04:002009-05-29T13:00:13.687-04:00Gene, god willing, I will never have to learn exac...Gene, god willing, I will never have to learn exactly why I am wrong about the possibility of analytic reasoning (though I would point out that I never said that a priori claims need to be analytic; I'm not a positivist!). But I'll grant the point.<br /><br />What I'm trying to convey is that I don't understand what it could possibly mean for something to be valuable independently from all valuers. It seems to me that to call something objectively valuable means "objectively worthy of being valued," as opposed to "objectively capable of inspiring valuing reactions in people," and I just don't know what it would mean to say that something is "objectively worthy of being valued." You're going to have to get me there; it doesn't seem like this is like "2+2=4" to me, and just saying "It's like how 2+2=4 is true" seems question-begging. 'Cause...well...nuh uh!<br /><br />As for the problem on your blog, my brain panics when it sees that many symbols. What point does it make?Dannyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14933199894935324897noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2473166537823294555.post-19559355141969677392009-05-29T12:28:46.031-04:002009-05-29T12:28:46.031-04:00"being the sort of living thing that is constituti..."being the sort of living thing that is constitutionally inclined to be attracted to stuff (like beauty, love, and Queen)"<br /><br />Well yeah. Who doesn't like Queen?Radical Hippohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11451555491453650730noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2473166537823294555.post-46007248529958915862009-05-28T16:00:29.578-04:002009-05-28T16:00:29.578-04:00Danny, you might also see Chapter VI of Brand Blan...Danny, you might also see Chapter VI of Brand Blanshard's <EM>Reason and Analysis</EM> for a thorough takedown of the positivist notion that all a priori truths are analytical, or C.H. Langford, 'A Proof that Synthetic A Priori Propositions Exist', <EM>Journal of Philosophy</EM>, Vol. 46. And do have a look at the problem I posted for you at Crash Landing.gcallahhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10065877215969589482noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2473166537823294555.post-37526854669437342532009-05-27T21:29:33.046-04:002009-05-27T21:29:33.046-04:00"Gene, 2+2=4 is just an application of definitions..."Gene, 2+2=4 is just an application of definitions of those symbols."<br /><br />Danny, I know some professor told you to say this, but doesn't it bother you that it was blown up by Quine almost 60 years ago? (Not that it ever made sense in the first place, but some analytical philosophers did believe it for a time.)gcallahhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10065877215969589482noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2473166537823294555.post-11861076114822936062009-05-27T21:25:04.592-04:002009-05-27T21:25:04.592-04:00"If you really try to get down to it, the universe..."If you really try to get down to it, the universe is just a collection of stuff evolving in the manner in which it's designed to unfold. Caring about it -- or any aspect of it -- is strictly not something that can be justified."<br /><br />Hmmm... now is that an empirical truth you discovered by doing some sort of experiment, or is it an analytical truth?gcallahhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10065877215969589482noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2473166537823294555.post-27012575493825680902009-05-27T20:03:58.513-04:002009-05-27T20:03:58.513-04:00Radical Hippo, maybe it will help to point out tha...Radical Hippo, maybe it will help to point out that you don't really need to <EM>justify</EM> the things you value. If you really try to get down to it, the universe is just a collection of stuff evolving in the manner in which it's designed to unfold. Caring about it -- or any aspect of it -- is strictly not something that can be justified. <br /><br />But we're humans, and we're here. And we value stuff! It's really okay; it's part of being a living thing, and being the sort of living thing that is constitutionally inclined to be attracted to stuff (like beauty, love, and Queen), to be inclined to be repulsed by stuff (like pain, seeing other people in pain, and people who treat other people like they don't matter), etc. We're people in a world of people, and it makes sense to act accordingly, even if at the end of the day, we're also just cosmic dust in a particular configuration for the moment.<br /><br />If what you're looking for is Meaning, I'm not sure you're going to find it. But if you're looking to find a way to enjoy your time while you're here, then that's a different story. And that's what fictionalism is all about.Dannyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14933199894935324897noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2473166537823294555.post-72360218530029617922009-05-27T19:52:45.033-04:002009-05-27T19:52:45.033-04:00Gene, 2+2=4 is just an application of definitions ...Gene, 2+2=4 is just an application of definitions of those symbols. It is simply a feature of what a "2" is that when a "2" is "added" to another "2," they "equal" a "4." If someone wanted to deny that, then they simply would be demonstrating a lack of understanding of the meaning of at least one of the relevant terms.<br /><br />I'm not sure that the same thing is clearly true of something like "Capricious killing is wrong" or "You ought not to kill capriciously." It's at least not so obviously true that you can just assert it as if it's self-evident.Dannyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14933199894935324897noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2473166537823294555.post-42167326295553101942009-05-26T19:03:39.342-04:002009-05-26T19:03:39.342-04:00Danny and Stan,
What I'm trying to find is someth...Danny and Stan,<br /><br />What I'm trying to find is something about the world besides a fictional account of right and wrong to justify our moral ideas and the actions that result from these ideas. <br /><br />We are in the curious position of having real feelings and creating values while simultaneously acknowledging that these feelings are best justified through a certain fiction, which is to say that there's no other justification other than the feeling itself. It seems that essentially we are acting as moral nihilists who can pretend otherwise; the fiction helps us explain our actions to moral realists, but does little to satisfy me as a fictionalist. I can't knowingly deceive myself this easily.<br /><br />That being the case, I think I was looking for something more tangible to account for our moral intuitions (why they exist, how they can be justified), and the result was a sort of universalized/rationalized empathy. Whether this is sufficient or accurate is debatable, and that's why I brought it up. Danny used the example of Vichy to show that this is not necessary, but that doesn't imply that it isn't sufficient.Radical Hippohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11451555491453650730noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2473166537823294555.post-20864053874445440372009-05-26T12:00:52.834-04:002009-05-26T12:00:52.834-04:00Yes, Dan, #1 is certainly wrong, just as it is tru...Yes, Dan, #1 is certainly wrong, just as it is true that, without mathematicians, 2 + 2 would still equal 4.<br /><br />See <A HREF="http://www.gene-callahan.org/blog/2009/05/big-big-formula.html" REL="nofollow">this</A> for more.gcallahhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10065877215969589482noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2473166537823294555.post-44620417465925656362009-05-25T18:04:03.224-04:002009-05-25T18:04:03.224-04:00Hippo, we already intuitively act as if Morality i...Hippo, we already intuitively act as if Morality is not fiction. That Morality often takes the form of a story, and further, is a narrative connected with our self-concept. We like that to be consistent, mostly for our remembered self. Our experiencing self is a hedonist of the present, although not unchecked. These are gross simplifications, and there is plenty of interplay, but as you observe, <I>we have moral feelings or ideas and then we try to explain them coherently, not typically the other way around.</I> Precisely. The narrative is rationalization, so disagreements between people about policies and the results of existing policies should be no surprise. Our delusions have significant consequences.<br /><br />Concepts of intrinsicness tend to crack and crumble under the microscope of science. Signaling cooperative heuristics morality (schmorality) is the real morality (the should), even though Morality (the Should) is perceived and intuited as reality.<br /><br />In your meta-layer, if I understand, the objective fact would be that a bunch of people share similar concepts of value about many things, which we would expect because people are so physiologically and psychologically similar. If we look at reactions and relationships between people that suggest they hold concepts of value, the only thing objectively real is that they are both signaling to one another and have some notion of how that signaling is perceived. I feel like you're searching for something more, though, and that's why I asked "Why?"<br /><br />I don't think your proposal is more proper, either, because to get a proper account of an organism, you have to dive into what it is and does. In the words of the late Amos Tversky, you take what the terrain gives. Philosophers that work mostly on logic, but don't bother with the science of evidence-supported premises, tend to ignore the terrain of reality. They generally ignore data that challenges their simplified theories, but there's a less obvious problem: they don't actively look for that data. If one cares about getting at the truth, one should peer at to the terrain. Often, it won't fit into our narrative.<br /><br />To answer your question--<I>So does it necessarily follow from the fictionalist standpoint that actually it's not really completely fictional?</I>--no, but it's relative. Is a fictionalist a human being, or a perfect superrational entity of only descriptive perception? Our meatware is wired in such a way where we're always creating Morality--a sort of prime directive that also creates a coherent narrative about who we are and what we should do. Vichy has this too. We act as if it's inrinsic to who we are. I would argue we also do this out of necessity: we don't have the capacity to keep a backlog of all the belief data points, much like the peak-end rule for pain (we average the peak pain point and end pain point of an experience to create a single data point for remembered experience). If we didn't have a pseudo-consistent self-concept, we couldn't function as human beings.<br /><br />The moral implications are certainly present. We are people, and when we use objectivity to attempt to make choices with better long-term consequences, we must remember why we're using objectivity in the first place. We must scientifically pursue schmorality to find the most reasonable morality, while trying to correct for the rationalizations inherent in Morality. During that juggling act, morality will update Morality a little bit here and there, and we'll make a little more progress.Stanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07658169777531617812noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2473166537823294555.post-77484516723375973832009-05-24T23:54:21.958-04:002009-05-24T23:54:21.958-04:00Well right; there aren't any moral implications of...Well right; there aren't any moral implications of my view, since it's pretty much a moral nihilistic perspective. I thought you were trying to rehabilitate a view closer to realism. Did I misunderstand?Dannyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14933199894935324897noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2473166537823294555.post-57445561572236528282009-05-24T23:35:57.580-04:002009-05-24T23:35:57.580-04:00Danny,
I think you've adequately summarized my th...Danny,<br /><br />I think you've adequately summarized my thoughts.<br /><br />Although... you mention there is no moral implication, and I agree. That being said, I don't really see the moral implications of your fictionalist account anyway. It seems that whatever we tell ourselves about how morality works is really just a story. We have moral feelings or ideas and then we try to explain them coherently, not typically the other way around.Radical Hippohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11451555491453650730noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2473166537823294555.post-91764242798651832882009-05-24T23:09:28.116-04:002009-05-24T23:09:28.116-04:00Gene, at this point I think I just have no idea wh...Gene, at this point I think I just have no idea where you're coming from. Let me see if I can get us to my understanding of the nihilist's position, and then you can tell me which step you think is wrong and why:<br /><br />1) Value is a mental phenomenon which proceeds from evaluation (conscious or unconscious); without evaluating minds it would be incoherent to speak of value.<br /><br />(To anticipate a possible objection, the value of a means is contingent on the value of the end for which it is a means; without evaluating minds there would be no valued ends, and so there could be no valuable means)<br /><br />2) People's minds work differently in ascribing value to objects, and there is the potential for irresolvable and reasonable pluralism about the value of ultimate ends (particularly with regard to the priority of values).<br /><br />3) If (1) and (2) are correct, then there is no objective standard by which all value claims can be judged definitively.<br /><br />(To preempt another possible objection, this doesn't mean that all value claims are equally good; it just means that it is not necessarily true that one hypothetical comprehensive account of value is correct and all accounts inconsistent with that correct account are incorrect.)<br /><br />4) Moral claims purport to state facts about the world. The claims are built on the idea that an object can literally <EM>be</EM> valuable (allowing for the idea that "being valuable" could involve only conformity to an objective standard of value and not to a mind-independent property).<br /><br />5) If (1) and (3) are correct, then no object can literally <EM>be</EM> valuable.<br /><br />6) If (4) and (5) are true, then the purported facts stated by moral claims are false.<br /><br />Obviously, you believe that at least one of these claims is wrong, but I'm not able to figure out exactly what the problem is.<br /><br />P.S. Crazy running into you yesterday at AIER; hope the rest of your day went well!Dannyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14933199894935324897noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2473166537823294555.post-33482247967816688992009-05-24T22:44:54.820-04:002009-05-24T22:44:54.820-04:00Hi, Radical Hippo, and thanks for the comment! Un...Hi, Radical Hippo, and thanks for the comment! Unfortunately, though, I'm not entirely sure I follow. It sounds to me that what you're saying is something like this:<br /><br />Even if values exist only in people's minds, they manifest themselves as attitudes that people objectively do hold. And when people do things to damage or eliminate objects that are valuable to other people, they do something that produces an objectively extant reaction in those people. Accordingly, there is something real about values, even if they aren't really "out there."<br /><br />I think this is basically right, but I'm not sure about its moral implications. Remember, morality is supposed to tell us what we <EM>ought</EM> to do. The previous paragraph, however, only brought up factual observations; the moral nihilist would be happy to concede those points. But maybe I'm not appreciating your argument properly; is there something I'm missing? Have I gotten it totally wrong?Dannyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14933199894935324897noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2473166537823294555.post-45496591271231872062009-05-23T14:43:10.241-04:002009-05-23T14:43:10.241-04:00Stan,
I don't think the idea necessarily lends it...Stan,<br /><br />I don't think the idea necessarily lends itself to being useful, but consequences of certain theories do not have to be useful to have some truth. I'm more concerned with getting a proper account of things than getting a necessarily useful account of things. <br /><br />So does it necessarily follow from the fictionalist standpoint that actually it's not really completely fictional?Radical Hippohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11451555491453650730noreply@blogger.com