tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2473166537823294555.post7712099539248139545..comments2023-11-02T06:04:23.552-04:00Comments on Back to the Drawing Board: Universally Preferable Behavior: An Overview of a Critique of Stefan Molyneux's TheoryDannyhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14933199894935324897noreply@blogger.comBlogger10125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2473166537823294555.post-68267150540301575442008-09-21T13:22:00.000-04:002008-09-21T13:22:00.000-04:00To the extent that your assessment is true, I don'...To the extent that your assessment is true, I don't think it's likely that the flaws in Stefan's theory are entirely to blame. I suppose it's possible that holding an incoherent ethical framework to be true might have negative consequences for one's psyche, or that the bad mental habits formed by adopting it could be detrimental. <BR/><BR/>But if the Molynites (I don't mean that pejoratively; it just sounds so much better than FDRers) are finding that their pursuit of philosophy is negatively affecting their lives and their ability to find happiness, it might be worthwhile to consider the case of a somewhat similar group: the Randians. I don't mean to stretch the comparison too far, but nevertheless I think it might be worthwhile for them (and you) to read Nathaniel Branden's excellent and penetrating reflection on his experience with Objectivism: <A>http://www.nathanielbranden.com/catalog/articles_essays/benefits_and_hazards.html</A>Danny Shaharhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16781136797017833336noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2473166537823294555.post-27041730117809397372008-09-21T10:50:00.000-04:002008-09-21T10:50:00.000-04:00I really agree with the part of your post that vic...I really agree with the part of your post that vichy quoted, about how Stefan's UPB has nothing to do with moreality. I think the best evidence for this is the FDRers themselves, who by and large seem to be lost in life.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16907441543211376944noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2473166537823294555.post-9196490454785543862008-09-09T11:34:00.000-04:002008-09-09T11:34:00.000-04:00Sweet; check this out if you haven't seen it: http...Sweet; check this out if you haven't seen it: <A HREF="" REL="nofollow">http://libertarian-left.blogspot.com/2008/09/why-does-it-make-sense-for-ethical.html</A>Danny Shaharhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16781136797017833336noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2473166537823294555.post-70593453460186549062008-09-09T09:14:00.000-04:002008-09-09T09:14:00.000-04:00Thanks. I have no problem with you using the ques...Thanks. I have no problem with you using the questions in a post. In the mean time, I'll find what I can on metaethics--I appreciate the pointer and your energies towards my education ;-)Jadhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11743291253516507802noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2473166537823294555.post-38601204146608325502008-09-09T00:49:00.000-04:002008-09-09T00:49:00.000-04:00Actually, I think it might be helpful for my to ta...Actually, I think it might be helpful for my to take a crack at this on a medium scale. So I'm just going to post my responses, and if you'd rather I took them down, I can definitely do that.Danny Shaharhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16781136797017833336noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2473166537823294555.post-6288442702140126792008-09-08T23:24:00.000-04:002008-09-08T23:24:00.000-04:00Thanks so much for your comments, Jad. Those aren...Thanks so much for your comments, Jad. Those aren't stupid questions at all, and they deserve a serious answer. Unfortunately, giving them the answer they deserve would take a whole lot of time, energy, and care, and for a very good reason: you're basically asking me to explain the fundamental nature of ethical theories, and that nature is up for very serious debate. In fact, there's an entire field of philosophy, called "Metaethics" which is solely dedicated to the exploration of these kinds of questions. And unfortunately, providing a survey of metaethical theory is neither something that I have time to attempt nor something that I would do even close to well if I tried.<BR/><BR/>However, I can try to offer some brief comments on your specific questions, and you can tell me if they clear anything up. If they don't, I can try to dig up some of the papers in metaethics that I've found particularly influential (no guarantees, though; it's been a while on a lot of that stuff, and it's not really my area of expertise). If neither of those options sound appealing, I can try to connect you with someone with a better background in metaethics than me (again, no guarantees) who can better help you work through these issues.<BR/><BR/>Because this comment box is tiny and cumbersome to write in, I'd prefer to respond to your questions in a separate blog post. But I can understand if you might not want your questions to be answered in such a public forum, so if you prefer, I can paste my answers into the comments box here when they're ready, or I can even e-mail them to you if you'd like. Just let me know what you'd prefer, and I'll make it happen.<BR/><BR/>Thanks so much for taking the time to check out my work, and I hope to hear from you soon!Danny Shaharhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16781136797017833336noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2473166537823294555.post-5782234998597105802008-09-08T23:09:00.000-04:002008-09-08T23:09:00.000-04:00I'm not a philosopher (I bet you love comments tha...I'm not a philosopher (I bet you love comments that start like that). I understand, as you say, it is "emphatically not" a requirement that an ethical/moral structure (sorry about the loose terms) make the same claim about what people should do independent of circumstances. Can this not be pointed to as the major failure of the philosophy of ethics?<BR/><BR/>My instinct (!=valid, I understand) is that a system that evaluates the interacting of moral agents in a convincing manner must be predicated on the axiom that, as evidenced by biology, all homo sapiens are largely "equal."<BR/><BR/>It seems at least that this axiom should stand until overturned. <BR/><BR/>Along the same lines, it seems appealing to me that a proposed moral framework should evaluate claims based on observable "reality." I know it's a word with wide interpretations, but let's say "reality" in the strict materialist sense.<BR/><BR/>As you say (I think) isn't the result of these two starting points the non-aggression principle? <BR/><BR/>Is the failure of UPB to do with one of these two axioms being "up for debate?" Or is the failure farther "down the line?" <BR/><BR/>I understand your issue with the cabin-in-winter or the flagpole scenario--is that the point-of-failure of UPB?<BR/><BR/>I know you've put alot of time into this work and have been frustrated by it, so I don't want to make you rehash the whole debate. I've also read (much of) your posts here and I understand many of the points you make. I guess I'm interested in having something like UPB that could undergo the kind of scrutiny you bring to bear. It seems to me that such a thing would have alot of value since it roundly rejects most of the "evils" in the world that are embraced by competing, widely accepted frameworks.<BR/><BR/>I appreciate your time and thought--I hope I'm not wasting much of either. If there's a better forum to pick your brain about this, point me to it.Jadhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11743291253516507802noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2473166537823294555.post-22717746547536888692008-09-08T12:53:00.000-04:002008-09-08T12:53:00.000-04:00Given my experience on the boards discussing it, I...Given my experience on the boards discussing it, I think that if the link exists not many proponents of theory seem to be aware of it.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2473166537823294555.post-61457770623968501362008-09-08T12:33:00.000-04:002008-09-08T12:33:00.000-04:00Haha thanks again, Vichy. To be honest, I ended u...Haha thanks again, Vichy. To be honest, I ended up skimming much of the later parts of the book just to find out whether Stefan was going to give some account of how his framework has anything to do with morality, and just didn't find anything. Because I went through pretty quickly, it's certainly possible that I missed something. So the invitation is certainly open to anyone who can show me the place in the text where Stefan clears up the issue. But if he doesn't, then it certainly seems like a fatal problem for the theory.Danny Shaharhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16781136797017833336noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2473166537823294555.post-30473175504375293292008-09-08T10:06:00.000-04:002008-09-08T10:06:00.000-04:00This section was the biggest stumbling block I ran...This section was the biggest stumbling block I ran into when debating UPB (or having UPB thrown at me while debating something else, like it's some miraculous cure-all):<BR/>"So the biggest problem with Stefan's morality is simply that it has nothing to do with morality. It doesn't give us any reason to do anything, except that our doing universally preferable things is in some sense "required" (though apparently not required for anything), whatever that means. It makes a bunch of really awkward distinctions, makes some claims about how philosophical paradigms need to work that don't seem to really be based on anything substantial, and basically rigs the deck so that we arrive at something that looks a lot like the familiar Non-Aggression Principle, but with all the constituent terms redefined so as to produce a result having nothing to do with the traditional Non-Aggression Principle. But it doesn't tell us anything about the way that we ought to live or how we ought to treat each other. So in pretty much every way I can think of, the theory has nothing to do with morality."<BR/>You basically summed up the entire book, and I can hardly believe you went through an entire book consisting of that sort of thing. Ye are made of sterner stuff than I, friend.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.com