So I was just alerted to the online availability of a brief presentation I gave at FEE's Young Scholars Colloquium last year, and I figured it would be worth posting here. I should note that the presentation was basically a response to not having enough student presentations to fill the time and needing one of the interns to jump in to eat space, so I don't pretend that anything particularly groundbreaking was said.
But without further ado, here's the link. My talk starts at 12:30, and discusses pollution taxes. In it, I make the claim that there are pollution taxes, and I'm not actually sure that's true...can anyone think of an example? That aside, I think it's pretty decent presentation, and I hope you all enjoy it!
My climate change presentation from this year's seminar will hopefully be coming online relatively soon -- and with video! -- so look forward to that...
Showing posts with label Compensation. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Compensation. Show all posts
Wednesday, July 15, 2009
Wednesday, October 22, 2008
Rights as Interests vs. Overall Wellbeing
My goal: I want to answer a question posed by Nozick in Anarchy, State, and Utopia in discussing rights and compensation:
I take it (controversially, I should add) that in at least some instances, we can knowingly infringe on others' rights without acting immorally, provided that we are willing and able to pay compensation (for now, I'll set aside the question of whether such infringements would be justified in the absence of compensation). In a sense, then, the willingness and ability to pay compensation to the victims of one's actions serve as justification of certain actions which would otherwise be unjustifiable. Let's go to Feinberg's hiker example:
I want to avoid the question of whether or not the hiker would be justified in breaking into the cabin if he were unwilling or unable to compensate the cabin's owner for the damage. The point is that it seems like the willingness and ability of the hiker to compensate the owner of the cabin for the damage would be sufficient (though again, perhaps not necessary) to justify the hiker's breaking into the cabin. That is to say that if a person were in the hiker's situation, and were willing and able to compensate the cabin's owner for damaging the cabin, then she would be justified in breaking into the cabin.
But things get a little complicated from there. Over the course of several posts (the rest of which will likely not be written any time soon, knowing me), I'd like to discuss a few factors that seem important to the conversation about a proper role for compensation as a justification for rights-infringements. In this post, I'll discuss the notion of rights as specific interests which must be considered apart from overall wellbeing, and in doing so I'll call into question the coherence of the concept of "wellbeing" itself. Second, I'll take a look at the suggestion that interests can be categorized as being "basic", "peripheral", etc., and that this framework can be used to distinguish between legitimate boundary-crossings and illegitimate ones. Third, I'll consider the mechanisms by which "proper compensation" can be determined, in light of the absence of a negotiated agreement between the victim and the boundary-crosser. Finally, I'll consider the interplay between the utilitarian argument in favor of compensated boundary-crossings and the rights-based argument in favor of deference to rights in the absence of negotiated consent.
So on to the subject of this post. There's this idea, which comes from the very old notion that beings have "a good", that we can think of a person as having a level of "wellbeing", and that things which detract from that overall level of wellbeing are "bad" for the individual, and things that increase that overall level of wellbeing are "good". Adopting this mindset, I think, leads an observer to an interesting way of thinking about things. As Michael Toman wrote in his essay, "Values in the Economics of Climate Change":
Though Toman was talking specifically about the issue of climate change, his point seems to be a general one. Take, for example, this definition from Nozick:
Notice that when Nozick says "worse off", he seems to be implying an "all-things-considered" sort of worse off. If we were to reject the notion that all benefits and harms can be thought of as being commensurable and interchangeable, then the only way to fully compensate someone for some kinds of invasions would seemingly be to never have performed them in the first place. To illustrate this, imagine that Cletus punched Suzie in the nose, causing harm to Suzie (she is not a masochist, and did not consent to this). If it were not the case that benefits and harms are commensurable and interchangeable, then we would need to think of how we could make Suzie no worse off in the way that Cletus made her worse off (than she would have been if she had not been punched in the nose). We could not accomplish this by doing something good for her after the fact, because this would be making her better off in a different way, as if this would somehow outweigh what had been done to her through the punch in the nose (by stipulation, we're not allowing this sort of weighing). I submit that nothing that Cletus could do would accomplish the task of compensating Suzie if benefits and harms were not commensurable and interchangeable.
The question Nozick posed, which is what I'm looking to answer, was whether or not a boundary crossing could be justified if compensation were paid. What I'm saying is that if there is not such a thing as an overall "wellbeing" -- if some kinds of benefits and harms are not commensurable and interchangeable -- then it might not make sense to talk about compensating Suzie for the punch; the only way to avoid making Suzie worse off in that particular way would be to not punch her. Accordingly, if certain costs and harms are not commensurable and interchangeable, then compensation of the Nozickian brand would sometimes be incoherent, and therefore could not legitimize a boundary crossing where the kinds of costs and benefits discussed here are involved. [I don't mean to suggest that this would rule out post-hoc restitution, only that this restitution would be a different sort of animal than compensation.]
Nozick anticipated this possibility when he wrote:
Take, then, the example of Edith Macefield. Edith Macefield, who passed away last month from pancreatic cancer, was an elderly Seattle resident whose tiny house stood in the way of a commercial development which was being constructed on her block. Edith refused to sell the house, though the developers offered her far more than the market value of the house, claiming that the money would be relatively worthless to her compared to the house, which she had every intention of inhabiting until her death. And so she did.
Now, if it were true that Edith's interest in living the rest of her life in her house were completely incommensurable with any other interests, then Nozick would seemingly be committed to saying that we would never be justified in forcing Edith out of her house, since to do so would be to treat her improperly, as a subordinate or a mere tool for the satisfaction of others' desires and not her own. But the kind of situation embodied in Feinberg's hiker example comes immediately to mind. What if, we might ask, we discovered that a rare substance was buried immediately underneath Edith's house, and that without access to this substance, many hundreds of people would die from a condition which only that substance could cure? What if the only way to get to the substance would be to dig underneath Edith's house in a way that (with existing technology) could not help but eliminate her ability to continue living there? Might we be justified, in order to save these hundreds of people, in destroying Edith's house or her capacity to inhabit it?
If we buy Nozick's claim entirely, the answer must be no. Edith, being an end-in-herself, is not to be sacrificed for the good of others, and so we would regrettably have to tell the hundreds of dying individuals that they had no recourse but to plead with Edith for permission to dig underneath her house, and if she refused, then that would be the end of things. As Nozick points out:
In the "rare substance" case, we must note that not only does Nozick's argument directly indicate what we should do, but the reasons one might offer in defense of destroying Edith's house are precisely the sorts of reasons that Nozick is rejecting as being amply justificatory of the kind of act in question.
But some people might find this argument implausible. Taking account of the separateness of persons might not mean, as Nozick argues it does, that we must treat them as infinitely inviolable. Some might argue that Edith's claim to have her house left alone is a very serious one, but would not lead us to condemn as unjust an action contradicting that claim which would save hundreds of lives. To properly evaluate this line of reasoning, though, we need to discuss the idea of evaluating the relative importance of different interests which, as we have seen, are not likely to be clearly commensurable. But that's a conversation for another day.
Are others forbidden to perform actions that transgress the boundary or encroach upon the circumscribed area, or are they permitted to perform such actions provided that they compensate the person whose boundary has been crossed?
I take it (controversially, I should add) that in at least some instances, we can knowingly infringe on others' rights without acting immorally, provided that we are willing and able to pay compensation (for now, I'll set aside the question of whether such infringements would be justified in the absence of compensation). In a sense, then, the willingness and ability to pay compensation to the victims of one's actions serve as justification of certain actions which would otherwise be unjustifiable. Let's go to Feinberg's hiker example:
Suppose that you are on a backpacking trip in the high mountain country when an unanticipated blizzard strikes the area with such ferocity that your life is imperiled. Fortunately, you stumble upon an unoccupied cabin, locked and boarded up for the winter, clearly somebody else’s private property. You smash in a window, enter, and huddle in a corner for three days until the storm abates.
I want to avoid the question of whether or not the hiker would be justified in breaking into the cabin if he were unwilling or unable to compensate the cabin's owner for the damage. The point is that it seems like the willingness and ability of the hiker to compensate the owner of the cabin for the damage would be sufficient (though again, perhaps not necessary) to justify the hiker's breaking into the cabin. That is to say that if a person were in the hiker's situation, and were willing and able to compensate the cabin's owner for damaging the cabin, then she would be justified in breaking into the cabin.
But things get a little complicated from there. Over the course of several posts (the rest of which will likely not be written any time soon, knowing me), I'd like to discuss a few factors that seem important to the conversation about a proper role for compensation as a justification for rights-infringements. In this post, I'll discuss the notion of rights as specific interests which must be considered apart from overall wellbeing, and in doing so I'll call into question the coherence of the concept of "wellbeing" itself. Second, I'll take a look at the suggestion that interests can be categorized as being "basic", "peripheral", etc., and that this framework can be used to distinguish between legitimate boundary-crossings and illegitimate ones. Third, I'll consider the mechanisms by which "proper compensation" can be determined, in light of the absence of a negotiated agreement between the victim and the boundary-crosser. Finally, I'll consider the interplay between the utilitarian argument in favor of compensated boundary-crossings and the rights-based argument in favor of deference to rights in the absence of negotiated consent.
So on to the subject of this post. There's this idea, which comes from the very old notion that beings have "a good", that we can think of a person as having a level of "wellbeing", and that things which detract from that overall level of wellbeing are "bad" for the individual, and things that increase that overall level of wellbeing are "good". Adopting this mindset, I think, leads an observer to an interesting way of thinking about things. As Michael Toman wrote in his essay, "Values in the Economics of Climate Change":
One...critique of climate change economics as a guide to policy involves the use of a single-dimension net benefit measure for evaluating different outcomes. This reflects the standard assumption in economics that all costs and benefits are commensurable and interchangeable once expressed in a common metric (a monetary metric as a representation of unobservable utility). There may be serious measurement problems in implementing such a reductionist metric, but as a concept the notion of full tradeoffs and thus full potential compensability of losses from climate change is ubiquitous in the economic model. This view differs from alternatives that see different kinds of values as less commensurable, e.g., some losses of natural beauty or function simply cannot be compensated by other welfare gains...
Though Toman was talking specifically about the issue of climate change, his point seems to be a general one. Take, for example, this definition from Nozick:
Something fully compensates a person for a loss if and only if it makes him no worse off than he otherwise would have been; it compensates person X for person Y's action A if X is no worse off receiving it, Y having done A, than X would have been without receiving it if Y had not done A.
Notice that when Nozick says "worse off", he seems to be implying an "all-things-considered" sort of worse off. If we were to reject the notion that all benefits and harms can be thought of as being commensurable and interchangeable, then the only way to fully compensate someone for some kinds of invasions would seemingly be to never have performed them in the first place. To illustrate this, imagine that Cletus punched Suzie in the nose, causing harm to Suzie (she is not a masochist, and did not consent to this). If it were not the case that benefits and harms are commensurable and interchangeable, then we would need to think of how we could make Suzie no worse off in the way that Cletus made her worse off (than she would have been if she had not been punched in the nose). We could not accomplish this by doing something good for her after the fact, because this would be making her better off in a different way, as if this would somehow outweigh what had been done to her through the punch in the nose (by stipulation, we're not allowing this sort of weighing). I submit that nothing that Cletus could do would accomplish the task of compensating Suzie if benefits and harms were not commensurable and interchangeable.
The question Nozick posed, which is what I'm looking to answer, was whether or not a boundary crossing could be justified if compensation were paid. What I'm saying is that if there is not such a thing as an overall "wellbeing" -- if some kinds of benefits and harms are not commensurable and interchangeable -- then it might not make sense to talk about compensating Suzie for the punch; the only way to avoid making Suzie worse off in that particular way would be to not punch her. Accordingly, if certain costs and harms are not commensurable and interchangeable, then compensation of the Nozickian brand would sometimes be incoherent, and therefore could not legitimize a boundary crossing where the kinds of costs and benefits discussed here are involved. [I don't mean to suggest that this would rule out post-hoc restitution, only that this restitution would be a different sort of animal than compensation.]
Nozick anticipated this possibility when he wrote:
If some injuries are not compensable, they would not fall under a policy of being allowed so long as compensation is paid. (Rather, they would be allowed provided compensation was paid, but since the compensation could not be paid by anyone, in effect they would be unallowed).
Take, then, the example of Edith Macefield. Edith Macefield, who passed away last month from pancreatic cancer, was an elderly Seattle resident whose tiny house stood in the way of a commercial development which was being constructed on her block. Edith refused to sell the house, though the developers offered her far more than the market value of the house, claiming that the money would be relatively worthless to her compared to the house, which she had every intention of inhabiting until her death. And so she did.
Now, if it were true that Edith's interest in living the rest of her life in her house were completely incommensurable with any other interests, then Nozick would seemingly be committed to saying that we would never be justified in forcing Edith out of her house, since to do so would be to treat her improperly, as a subordinate or a mere tool for the satisfaction of others' desires and not her own. But the kind of situation embodied in Feinberg's hiker example comes immediately to mind. What if, we might ask, we discovered that a rare substance was buried immediately underneath Edith's house, and that without access to this substance, many hundreds of people would die from a condition which only that substance could cure? What if the only way to get to the substance would be to dig underneath Edith's house in a way that (with existing technology) could not help but eliminate her ability to continue living there? Might we be justified, in order to save these hundreds of people, in destroying Edith's house or her capacity to inhabit it?
If we buy Nozick's claim entirely, the answer must be no. Edith, being an end-in-herself, is not to be sacrificed for the good of others, and so we would regrettably have to tell the hundreds of dying individuals that they had no recourse but to plead with Edith for permission to dig underneath her house, and if she refused, then that would be the end of things. As Nozick points out:
…there is no social entity with a good that undergoes a sacrifice for its own good. There are only individual people, with their own individual lives. Using one of these people for the benefit of others, uses him and benefits the others. Nothing more. What happens is something is done to him for the sake of others. Talk of an overall social good covers this up. (Intentionally?) To use a person in this way does not sufficiently respect and take account of the fact that he is a separate person, that his is the only life he has. He does not get some overbalancing good for his sacrifice, and no one is entitled to force this upon him.
In the "rare substance" case, we must note that not only does Nozick's argument directly indicate what we should do, but the reasons one might offer in defense of destroying Edith's house are precisely the sorts of reasons that Nozick is rejecting as being amply justificatory of the kind of act in question.
But some people might find this argument implausible. Taking account of the separateness of persons might not mean, as Nozick argues it does, that we must treat them as infinitely inviolable. Some might argue that Edith's claim to have her house left alone is a very serious one, but would not lead us to condemn as unjust an action contradicting that claim which would save hundreds of lives. To properly evaluate this line of reasoning, though, we need to discuss the idea of evaluating the relative importance of different interests which, as we have seen, are not likely to be clearly commensurable. But that's a conversation for another day.
Thursday, June 12, 2008
Cap and Trade vs. the Carbon Tax
So I've been addressing the issue of anthropogenic climate change for some time now, and I haven't said much in the way of addressing specific policy proposals. But I was just given a delightful present by one of my fellow FEE associates: a copy of the American Institute for Economic Research's latest Economic Education Bulletin, entitled "The Global Warming Debate: Science, Economics, and Policy." I didn't read the whole thing, but my favorite part was definitely when William R. Cotton, a professor of atmospheric science at Colorado State, closed his completely science-oriented essay, "Summary View of Climate Change," with:
Period, end of conversation. No comment on that gem anywhere else in the entire essay. Who's got two thumbs and loves it? This guy.
But anyway, that's not the point. Later in the publication was an essay by Kenneth P. Green, a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, where it was argued that a carbon tax is superior to a cap-and-trade system. I bounced between frustration, amusement, and glee as I read it, and felt an immediate need to comment. Not because Green did a bad job--he did just fine--but because he was guilty of something which is very common among people who discuss climate change: he discussed the possible "solutions" to climate change without addressing the reasons that a policy was to be implemented in the first place, and how the different solutions worked to address those reasons. His argument for a tax scheme over a cap-and-trade scheme was simply that a tax scheme could achieve the same goals, but with better economic side-effects and less potential for failure. Fine, I'll even grant it. But taxes and caps are fundamentally different policies, which only make even a little sense when confronted by specific sorts of problems.
I should explain what I mean. I've discussed elsewhere the idea that in order to make any sense from an ethical point of view, pollution taxes need to be based on the idea that an individual is justified in polluting if and only if she pays compensation to her victims for any damage done to them. That idea is controversial, but for our purposes we don't need to address that controversy. The point is only that even if we accept that idea as true, there are still only certain kinds of instances in which the injustice of pollution can legitimately be dealt with through a tax on pollution. The paradigm cases are those instances in which the damage caused by pollution is directly proportional to the amount of pollution that there is, so that the tax becomes the "price" of compensating the victims of one's actions for the costs one imposes upon them.
Cap and trade schemes, on the other hand, are built for an entirely different kind of problem. In a paradigm cap and trade situation, there is a threshold level of pollution with which policymakers are concerned, and at the threshold, a certain amount of damage is anticipated. The cap and trade scheme accordingly sets the cap at the relevant amount of pollution, and then distributes "shares" of the "environmental space" below that threshold in some way (e.g., auction, grandfathering system...). Because the allocations may be economically inefficient for whatever reason, the shares can then be traded in accordance with the wishes of their owners in order to ensure that the right to pollute is distributed to those individuals who are willing to pay the most for it (note that the normal objections to the "willingness to pay" criterion are avoided by passing the buck to the distribution process, which of course must be justified separately).
The point I want to make here is that global climate change is a very different phenomenon than the sorts of phenomena for which either of these policies is built to provide a solution. As noted elsewhere, climate change is an emergent problem. That is, climate change is not the result of any individual's actions, but rather is the consequence of many individuals acting separately, so that no individual can reasonably be said to have been able to prevent climate change from occurring, and no individual could have caused climate change singlehandedly. Accordingly, it does not make sense to talk about the consequences of climate change in terms of marginal contributions. The amount of damage caused by climate change will not likely change recognizeably with an additional increment of CO2 (or any other forcing agent), so it's not reasonable to try to put a price on how much damage "a unit of climate forcing" (expressed, perhaps, in terms of GWP, or Global Warming Potential, as defined by the IPCC?) causes.
A tax on contributions to climate change, therefore, seems like a policy which would require a bit of shoehorning. Individuals paying the tax would not be paying the "social cost" of their particular contribution, taken in isolation, because that would be basically zero. They would need to be charged for their "portion" of the total amount of damage done by climate change. So what policymakers would need to do would be to determine the total amount of damage which would be done at the equilibrium price for pollution permits, and then sell the permits at that price. The problem then becomes one of economic calculation. It could be done to some degree, but it would be inherently imprecise. And remember: the end result needs to be that the victims get compensated, so the government would have to go into its own pockets (that is to say, the pockets of its treasury or, more realistically, the pockets of its Federal Reserve printing press) to take care of the balance if it aimed low. And as my wonderful economist friends would point out, there would be a considerable incentive to aim high, creating a surplus revenue stream for the government which would almost certainly not be returned. So the tax is doable, kind of, but the problem is not the kind of thing that the tax is designed for. It's just that you can use the tax to accomplish the end goal if you want.
The cap and trade system is a little harder to adapt to the task, but there are a number of ways that the idea can be useful. First, there is a level to which we could collectively exert a forcing on the climate system without producing objectionable consequences. This level of climate forcing is a threshold which could be amenable to a soft cap and trade scheme (soft like the baseball salary cap). In this kind of policy, the cap would be set at the level of forcing which would produce no negative consequences, and this "environmental space" would be allocated somehow (or, if people find this to be a bad idea, we would simply say that these shares should be allocated in proportion to one's contribution to climate change, so that the soft cap has no effect). People not receiving these shares, or polluting in excess of their shares, would be filling environmental space which represented something like "harmful social emissions". Because these emissions would not be legitimated by the soft cap, they would be the ones which would be subject to the obligation to compensate the victims (again, if the soft cap isn't being used, as mentioned above, it would just be that everyone would have to participate in compensating the victims).
Here a potential for another cap would become apparent: We might imagine that policymakers would decide on a level of pollution (corresponding to some amount of total damage) which was determined to be "socially desirable" somehow. Perhaps, using the same reasoning involved in the tax scheme discussed above, the policymakers would arrive at the level of pollution which would clear the market if everyone paid some price for it. Or perhaps the policymakers would identify a level of pollution beyond which unacceptable results would occur, and the cap would be set there. In any case, you would then have to set a cap and allocate the shares. So again, the policy could be made to work. But the problems are simply that it's difficult to identify a level of "unacceptable" pollution, it's just as difficult to identify a market clearing price in this scheme as it is with the tax (assuming that the shares are auctioned, of course), and any other way of running the scheme is sure to carry either difficulties of its own, or charges of arbitrariness which would sever the connection between the problem and the solution.
So ultimately, what we're faced with is a situation in which the only two policy suggestions that are on the table are not particularly well suited to the task of "solving" the problems arising from climate change (and I haven't even begun to address the question of how the compensation process would even work, or whether compensation could make climate change legitimate!), and the only way to make either of them work is to basically stretch and contort them until they are made to do the job acceptably. Doing so, it will be noted, requires in both cases that government decision-makers possess knowledge and foresight which they almost certainly do not have, and even then it's unclear that the policies would work properly.
Obviously, there's a lot more to say about this. I just wanted to get some preliminary thoughts down, and I think this was a good start.
There are strong indications that our global climate is warming. But the question is, is the warming due to anthropogenic greenhouse gases, or is it due to some other forcing mechanisms (or their transient absence) and natural variability. As human population on Earth continues to increase, the chances of human-induced changes in climate due to greenhouse gases, aerosol pollution, or alterations in land use become increasingly likely. Thus, rather than consider climate engineering, we should devise methods of encouraging the reduction of population growth through economic and quality-of-life incentives.
Period, end of conversation. No comment on that gem anywhere else in the entire essay. Who's got two thumbs and loves it? This guy.
But anyway, that's not the point. Later in the publication was an essay by Kenneth P. Green, a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, where it was argued that a carbon tax is superior to a cap-and-trade system. I bounced between frustration, amusement, and glee as I read it, and felt an immediate need to comment. Not because Green did a bad job--he did just fine--but because he was guilty of something which is very common among people who discuss climate change: he discussed the possible "solutions" to climate change without addressing the reasons that a policy was to be implemented in the first place, and how the different solutions worked to address those reasons. His argument for a tax scheme over a cap-and-trade scheme was simply that a tax scheme could achieve the same goals, but with better economic side-effects and less potential for failure. Fine, I'll even grant it. But taxes and caps are fundamentally different policies, which only make even a little sense when confronted by specific sorts of problems.
I should explain what I mean. I've discussed elsewhere the idea that in order to make any sense from an ethical point of view, pollution taxes need to be based on the idea that an individual is justified in polluting if and only if she pays compensation to her victims for any damage done to them. That idea is controversial, but for our purposes we don't need to address that controversy. The point is only that even if we accept that idea as true, there are still only certain kinds of instances in which the injustice of pollution can legitimately be dealt with through a tax on pollution. The paradigm cases are those instances in which the damage caused by pollution is directly proportional to the amount of pollution that there is, so that the tax becomes the "price" of compensating the victims of one's actions for the costs one imposes upon them.
Cap and trade schemes, on the other hand, are built for an entirely different kind of problem. In a paradigm cap and trade situation, there is a threshold level of pollution with which policymakers are concerned, and at the threshold, a certain amount of damage is anticipated. The cap and trade scheme accordingly sets the cap at the relevant amount of pollution, and then distributes "shares" of the "environmental space" below that threshold in some way (e.g., auction, grandfathering system...). Because the allocations may be economically inefficient for whatever reason, the shares can then be traded in accordance with the wishes of their owners in order to ensure that the right to pollute is distributed to those individuals who are willing to pay the most for it (note that the normal objections to the "willingness to pay" criterion are avoided by passing the buck to the distribution process, which of course must be justified separately).
The point I want to make here is that global climate change is a very different phenomenon than the sorts of phenomena for which either of these policies is built to provide a solution. As noted elsewhere, climate change is an emergent problem. That is, climate change is not the result of any individual's actions, but rather is the consequence of many individuals acting separately, so that no individual can reasonably be said to have been able to prevent climate change from occurring, and no individual could have caused climate change singlehandedly. Accordingly, it does not make sense to talk about the consequences of climate change in terms of marginal contributions. The amount of damage caused by climate change will not likely change recognizeably with an additional increment of CO2 (or any other forcing agent), so it's not reasonable to try to put a price on how much damage "a unit of climate forcing" (expressed, perhaps, in terms of GWP, or Global Warming Potential, as defined by the IPCC?) causes.
A tax on contributions to climate change, therefore, seems like a policy which would require a bit of shoehorning. Individuals paying the tax would not be paying the "social cost" of their particular contribution, taken in isolation, because that would be basically zero. They would need to be charged for their "portion" of the total amount of damage done by climate change. So what policymakers would need to do would be to determine the total amount of damage which would be done at the equilibrium price for pollution permits, and then sell the permits at that price. The problem then becomes one of economic calculation. It could be done to some degree, but it would be inherently imprecise. And remember: the end result needs to be that the victims get compensated, so the government would have to go into its own pockets (that is to say, the pockets of its treasury or, more realistically, the pockets of its Federal Reserve printing press) to take care of the balance if it aimed low. And as my wonderful economist friends would point out, there would be a considerable incentive to aim high, creating a surplus revenue stream for the government which would almost certainly not be returned. So the tax is doable, kind of, but the problem is not the kind of thing that the tax is designed for. It's just that you can use the tax to accomplish the end goal if you want.
The cap and trade system is a little harder to adapt to the task, but there are a number of ways that the idea can be useful. First, there is a level to which we could collectively exert a forcing on the climate system without producing objectionable consequences. This level of climate forcing is a threshold which could be amenable to a soft cap and trade scheme (soft like the baseball salary cap). In this kind of policy, the cap would be set at the level of forcing which would produce no negative consequences, and this "environmental space" would be allocated somehow (or, if people find this to be a bad idea, we would simply say that these shares should be allocated in proportion to one's contribution to climate change, so that the soft cap has no effect). People not receiving these shares, or polluting in excess of their shares, would be filling environmental space which represented something like "harmful social emissions". Because these emissions would not be legitimated by the soft cap, they would be the ones which would be subject to the obligation to compensate the victims (again, if the soft cap isn't being used, as mentioned above, it would just be that everyone would have to participate in compensating the victims).
Here a potential for another cap would become apparent: We might imagine that policymakers would decide on a level of pollution (corresponding to some amount of total damage) which was determined to be "socially desirable" somehow. Perhaps, using the same reasoning involved in the tax scheme discussed above, the policymakers would arrive at the level of pollution which would clear the market if everyone paid some price for it. Or perhaps the policymakers would identify a level of pollution beyond which unacceptable results would occur, and the cap would be set there. In any case, you would then have to set a cap and allocate the shares. So again, the policy could be made to work. But the problems are simply that it's difficult to identify a level of "unacceptable" pollution, it's just as difficult to identify a market clearing price in this scheme as it is with the tax (assuming that the shares are auctioned, of course), and any other way of running the scheme is sure to carry either difficulties of its own, or charges of arbitrariness which would sever the connection between the problem and the solution.
So ultimately, what we're faced with is a situation in which the only two policy suggestions that are on the table are not particularly well suited to the task of "solving" the problems arising from climate change (and I haven't even begun to address the question of how the compensation process would even work, or whether compensation could make climate change legitimate!), and the only way to make either of them work is to basically stretch and contort them until they are made to do the job acceptably. Doing so, it will be noted, requires in both cases that government decision-makers possess knowledge and foresight which they almost certainly do not have, and even then it's unclear that the policies would work properly.
Obviously, there's a lot more to say about this. I just wanted to get some preliminary thoughts down, and I think this was a good start.
Friday, May 30, 2008
The Responsibility Principle vs. Breach of Duty
So I stumbled upon a really jarring debate today. I'm sort of puzzled that I haven't already heard of this issue, and am suspicious that someone might just be able to explain to me why there isn't any problem, and I'm just confused. But in any case, here's the issue.
It seems that in our current legal system, in order to establish that someone owes you damages to compensate you for a tort, you need to show that they have breached a duty that they owed to you. If it is determined that they did nothing wrong in harming you, then the idea is that they don't owe you anything.
But on the other hand, there's this, care of Joel Feinberg:
I agree that the hiker is justified in his actions. But as Judith Thomson points out, it seems true that in this case, the hiker would also be obligated to compensate the owner of the cabin for the damage. This is in line with a principle central to the doctrine of Strict Liability, called the Responsibility Principle. Talbot Paige phrased the principle like this: "When A's actions impose costs on B, A should be made responsible, by paying those costs." It sort of does seem like this is why the hiker should have to compensate the cabin owner. Even though the hiker didn't do anything wrong, he still imposed a cost on the cabin owner, and he should have to pay that cost.
So it seems like I'm rejecting the "duty of care" standard. But on the other hand, I feel like there are some situations in which Strict Liability is, well, too strict. It seems to me that the concept of negligence (as distinct from something like "mere harming") is not completely without value: I find it an attractive notion that in situations where a person does nothing wrong, they should not be subject to the coercive pressure of others (through being held to account for something by a court--here I obviously don't mean "coercive" to imply that there's anything objectionable about holding people accountable through courts).
I definitely need to think about this some more; any thoughts or suggestions would be very much appreciated!
It seems that in our current legal system, in order to establish that someone owes you damages to compensate you for a tort, you need to show that they have breached a duty that they owed to you. If it is determined that they did nothing wrong in harming you, then the idea is that they don't owe you anything.
But on the other hand, there's this, care of Joel Feinberg:
Suppose that you are on a backpacking trip in the high mountain country when an unanticipated blizzard strikes the area with such ferocity that your life is imperiled. Fortunately, you stumble upon an unoccupied cabin, locked and boarded up for the winter, clearly somebody else’s private property. You smash in a window, enter, and huddle in a corner for three days until the storm abates. During this period you help yourself to your unknown benefactor’s food supply and burn his wooden furniture in the fireplace to keep warm. Surely you are justified in doing all these things, and yet you have infringed the clear rights of another person.
I agree that the hiker is justified in his actions. But as Judith Thomson points out, it seems true that in this case, the hiker would also be obligated to compensate the owner of the cabin for the damage. This is in line with a principle central to the doctrine of Strict Liability, called the Responsibility Principle. Talbot Paige phrased the principle like this: "When A's actions impose costs on B, A should be made responsible, by paying those costs." It sort of does seem like this is why the hiker should have to compensate the cabin owner. Even though the hiker didn't do anything wrong, he still imposed a cost on the cabin owner, and he should have to pay that cost.
So it seems like I'm rejecting the "duty of care" standard. But on the other hand, I feel like there are some situations in which Strict Liability is, well, too strict. It seems to me that the concept of negligence (as distinct from something like "mere harming") is not completely without value: I find it an attractive notion that in situations where a person does nothing wrong, they should not be subject to the coercive pressure of others (through being held to account for something by a court--here I obviously don't mean "coercive" to imply that there's anything objectionable about holding people accountable through courts).
I definitely need to think about this some more; any thoughts or suggestions would be very much appreciated!
Wednesday, April 2, 2008
Preemptive Compensation
One question I've been thinking about recently is the idea of preemptive compensation; that is, compensation paid in advance of a particular damaging event actually happening. I wanted to broach the subject here, as a starting point for future discussion. I'll start by sketching why the idea of preemptive compensation is important at all.
Let's say that Betsy launches a rocket into space, and calculates that it will eventually return to the Earth and land on Murray's house, but that this will take 10 years. Betsy acknowledges that when the rocket returns to Earth, it will damage Murray's house, and she should be held accountable for that damage. But sadly, Betsy is quite old, and doesn't expect to live anywhere near long enough to see the impact.
Murray considers the situation in which he finds himself, and sees a problem looming. He anticipates that Betsy will spend all of her savings by the time she dies (Betsy is willing to acknowledge that this is likely to be the case), and if he waits until the rocket lands on his house, there will be no way to do anything about it. Betsy won't be around anymore, and there will be no estate from which he can demand compensation.
It seems to me that Murray would be right to demand that he be guaranteed compensation for the future damage which will be dealt to him. To require that Murray wait until the damage eventuates would be to deny him compensation entirely. And given that we already know what will happen to Murray, and we agree that Betsy ought to be held accountable for what happens to him, it seems unfair that we should deny Murray restitution for the damage that he will surely be dealt.
One way to approach this would be to say that Murray should only be entitled to compensation when the harm eventuates, and so Betsy is only responsible for ensuring that when the rocket lands on his house, proper arrangements have been made to compensate Murray. So, for example, if there will be $50,000 of damages that Murray can legitimately claim (including the damage to his house, as well as any compensation for the inconvenience), Betsy only needs to ensure that when the rocket lands, there is $50,000 available to compensate him. Betsy wouldn't have to pay Murray the $50,000 immediately, but would only have to guarantee that it would be given to him when the rocket landed. Because it might be difficult to administer such a rule, it might be fair for the courts to require that Betsy pay Murray the present value of the damage in the future, or to require that Betsy secure a no-risk, interest-bearing investment on Murray's behalf which would pay the $50,000 at the appropriate time. This would ensure that Murray was compensated, but also that Betsy was not deprived of more than we might think she ought to be.
But in reaching this conclusion, we have not mentioned what is undoubtedly the most important consideration in this problem, which is uncertainty. We have spoken as if we knew exactly what would happen to Murray 10 years after Betsy launched the rocket, when it landed on his house and damaged it. It's quite probable that in any case like this one, we won't actually know what will happen to Murray's house. Perhaps there is a range of levels of damage we can conceive of as being possible scenarios for when Betsy's rocket hits Murray's house. What then?
One possible way to approach this problem would be to gather more information. But it might not be possible to collect the necessary information before it's too late. As Murray is unable to wait to see what the damage actually is, it could be that he has no real choice but to go to court with considerable uncertainty over the consequences of Betsy's action. Perhaps he can demonstrate that the actual damage will, with a high level of confidence, be within the range of $40,000-60,000, with a "best guess" of $50,000. What should Betsy be held accountable for?
One answer would be to say that since Murray can't prove the precise nature of Betsy's offense, that he fails to meet the burden of proof which would be required to hold Betsy responsible at all. But this seems clearly wrong. We agree that Betsy's actions will cause damage to Murray, and we agree that we won't know the precise nature of the damage until it's too late. It seems patently unfair to completely deny Murray's case on the basis of him lacking knowledge of the exact amount of the damage.
Another route would be to come down on Murray's side, and to say that he should be entitled to the maximum amount of damage that could reasonably be expected. The reasoning behind this would be that Betsy is the one who's at fault here; if there's any uncertainty, the burden should fall on her. After all, she's the one who launched the rocket, not Murray; it would be a real shame if the rocket landed and ended up doing more damage than Murray had been compensated for, especially if we knew that there was a reasonable chance that things would turn out the way they did.
I can definitely see why someone would want to argue this way, and I don't think that they'd be wrong to do so. But I could also see why someone would object to this treatment. One could point to that fact that libertarians have generally taken the position that it's somehow worse to let an existing damage go unrepaired than to punish an innocent person for something for which they are not responsible. As Murray Rothbard wrote in his essay, "Law, Property Rights, and Air Pollution," when "...it is unclear whether an individual is committing aggression...the only procedure consonant with libertarian principle is to do nothing; to lean over backwards to ensure that the judicial agency is not coercing an innocent man." But of course, in our example, Betsy is not innocent. In fact, that's the entire intuition behind making her bear the burden of the potential harm.
But the fact remains that if the rocket struck and did less damage than the maximum amount that could have been reasonable expected, then it would mean that Betsy would have been punished for a degree of damage which she did not cause. And because we're talking about the largest reasonably expectable damage, it's extremely likely that this sort of overpunishment will happen under this policy. So for people who believe that we should be protected from being punished more than we deserve, the policy in question here would be extremely troublesome.
Accordingly, we might place the burden of uncertainty on Murray, and say that he is entitled to compensation for the lowest amount of damage that could reasonably be expected. The argument here would be that the burden of proof is on the victim to show that someone harmed them, and the mere possibility of greater damage doesn't satisfy this burden of proof. The lowest amount of damage that could reasonably be expected would constitute the sort of thing that could be looked at as "proven" in court, but moving beyond that would seem to indict Betsy on "the possibility" that she is guilty.
It should be noted that the same sort of problem that confronted the last policy applies to this one, except in reverse: In all likelihood, Murray will be compensated for less damage than he will actually incur. This might make people uncomfortable, for the simple fact that Murray's the victim here. It could seem like we're going out of our way to protect the person who did something wrong, and chose to do it, very likely at the expense of the person who did nothing wrong, and in fact did nothing at all. So this policy is somewhat questionable as well.
A final approach would be to hold Betsy liable for the amount of damage representing the scenario where the chances of more damage eventuating are the same as the chances of less damage eventuating. The core virtue of this policy is obvious: it represents a compromise, placing an equal portion of the burden of the uncertainty on both parties. But of course, in the eyes of many, this virtue will also be its main weakness: by placing half of the burden on Murray, it ensures a good chance that he will be undercompensated, and by placing half on Betsy, it ensures a good chance that she will be overcharged.
It seems to me that this discussion highlights a very simple point: what will appeal to you as the correct way to deal with uncertainty will depend on your views regarding the purpose of the burden of proof. If the spirit of the burden of proof is to ensure that innocent individuals are protected, then you will likely feel that the victim -- who is the only innocent party -- should bear less of the burden of uncertainty. On the other hand, if you view the burden of proof as protecting individuals from having to pay for damage that they have not been proven to have caused, then you will likely come down on the side of placing the burden on the victim. I will not take a stance on this issue here, since I honestly don't know what to think.
Before calling it quits on this subject, I want to touch on one more potential problem for Murray's case against Betsy. Namely, Murray might not be able to prove that Betsy's rocket will hit his house at all. It seems to me that uncertainty of this sort is very different from the kind of uncertainty discussed above. It is uncertainty regarding whether or not the harmful event will occur at all, rather than uncertainty regarding how severe the damage caused by the harmful event will be. On this issue, I think our current system has the tools to tell us what should be done. That is, our normal ideas regarding the burden of proof seem more or less adequate for dealing with cases like Murray's. Perhaps we might want to allow for a slightly more relaxed standard, given that our current standard might create a systemic bias towards placing burdens on victims, but that seems like something that can be discussed without breaking new ground.
So I guess I haven't really reached any firm conclusions about preemptive compensation in this post, but I think that as far as providing a starting point for discussion, I'm happy with this. It seems like the next step needs to be a discussion of what the proper role of the burden of proof ought to be. But I think I'll stop for now and deal with that later.
Let's say that Betsy launches a rocket into space, and calculates that it will eventually return to the Earth and land on Murray's house, but that this will take 10 years. Betsy acknowledges that when the rocket returns to Earth, it will damage Murray's house, and she should be held accountable for that damage. But sadly, Betsy is quite old, and doesn't expect to live anywhere near long enough to see the impact.
Murray considers the situation in which he finds himself, and sees a problem looming. He anticipates that Betsy will spend all of her savings by the time she dies (Betsy is willing to acknowledge that this is likely to be the case), and if he waits until the rocket lands on his house, there will be no way to do anything about it. Betsy won't be around anymore, and there will be no estate from which he can demand compensation.
It seems to me that Murray would be right to demand that he be guaranteed compensation for the future damage which will be dealt to him. To require that Murray wait until the damage eventuates would be to deny him compensation entirely. And given that we already know what will happen to Murray, and we agree that Betsy ought to be held accountable for what happens to him, it seems unfair that we should deny Murray restitution for the damage that he will surely be dealt.
One way to approach this would be to say that Murray should only be entitled to compensation when the harm eventuates, and so Betsy is only responsible for ensuring that when the rocket lands on his house, proper arrangements have been made to compensate Murray. So, for example, if there will be $50,000 of damages that Murray can legitimately claim (including the damage to his house, as well as any compensation for the inconvenience), Betsy only needs to ensure that when the rocket lands, there is $50,000 available to compensate him. Betsy wouldn't have to pay Murray the $50,000 immediately, but would only have to guarantee that it would be given to him when the rocket landed. Because it might be difficult to administer such a rule, it might be fair for the courts to require that Betsy pay Murray the present value of the damage in the future, or to require that Betsy secure a no-risk, interest-bearing investment on Murray's behalf which would pay the $50,000 at the appropriate time. This would ensure that Murray was compensated, but also that Betsy was not deprived of more than we might think she ought to be.
But in reaching this conclusion, we have not mentioned what is undoubtedly the most important consideration in this problem, which is uncertainty. We have spoken as if we knew exactly what would happen to Murray 10 years after Betsy launched the rocket, when it landed on his house and damaged it. It's quite probable that in any case like this one, we won't actually know what will happen to Murray's house. Perhaps there is a range of levels of damage we can conceive of as being possible scenarios for when Betsy's rocket hits Murray's house. What then?
One possible way to approach this problem would be to gather more information. But it might not be possible to collect the necessary information before it's too late. As Murray is unable to wait to see what the damage actually is, it could be that he has no real choice but to go to court with considerable uncertainty over the consequences of Betsy's action. Perhaps he can demonstrate that the actual damage will, with a high level of confidence, be within the range of $40,000-60,000, with a "best guess" of $50,000. What should Betsy be held accountable for?
One answer would be to say that since Murray can't prove the precise nature of Betsy's offense, that he fails to meet the burden of proof which would be required to hold Betsy responsible at all. But this seems clearly wrong. We agree that Betsy's actions will cause damage to Murray, and we agree that we won't know the precise nature of the damage until it's too late. It seems patently unfair to completely deny Murray's case on the basis of him lacking knowledge of the exact amount of the damage.
Another route would be to come down on Murray's side, and to say that he should be entitled to the maximum amount of damage that could reasonably be expected. The reasoning behind this would be that Betsy is the one who's at fault here; if there's any uncertainty, the burden should fall on her. After all, she's the one who launched the rocket, not Murray; it would be a real shame if the rocket landed and ended up doing more damage than Murray had been compensated for, especially if we knew that there was a reasonable chance that things would turn out the way they did.
I can definitely see why someone would want to argue this way, and I don't think that they'd be wrong to do so. But I could also see why someone would object to this treatment. One could point to that fact that libertarians have generally taken the position that it's somehow worse to let an existing damage go unrepaired than to punish an innocent person for something for which they are not responsible. As Murray Rothbard wrote in his essay, "Law, Property Rights, and Air Pollution," when "...it is unclear whether an individual is committing aggression...the only procedure consonant with libertarian principle is to do nothing; to lean over backwards to ensure that the judicial agency is not coercing an innocent man." But of course, in our example, Betsy is not innocent. In fact, that's the entire intuition behind making her bear the burden of the potential harm.
But the fact remains that if the rocket struck and did less damage than the maximum amount that could have been reasonable expected, then it would mean that Betsy would have been punished for a degree of damage which she did not cause. And because we're talking about the largest reasonably expectable damage, it's extremely likely that this sort of overpunishment will happen under this policy. So for people who believe that we should be protected from being punished more than we deserve, the policy in question here would be extremely troublesome.
Accordingly, we might place the burden of uncertainty on Murray, and say that he is entitled to compensation for the lowest amount of damage that could reasonably be expected. The argument here would be that the burden of proof is on the victim to show that someone harmed them, and the mere possibility of greater damage doesn't satisfy this burden of proof. The lowest amount of damage that could reasonably be expected would constitute the sort of thing that could be looked at as "proven" in court, but moving beyond that would seem to indict Betsy on "the possibility" that she is guilty.
It should be noted that the same sort of problem that confronted the last policy applies to this one, except in reverse: In all likelihood, Murray will be compensated for less damage than he will actually incur. This might make people uncomfortable, for the simple fact that Murray's the victim here. It could seem like we're going out of our way to protect the person who did something wrong, and chose to do it, very likely at the expense of the person who did nothing wrong, and in fact did nothing at all. So this policy is somewhat questionable as well.
A final approach would be to hold Betsy liable for the amount of damage representing the scenario where the chances of more damage eventuating are the same as the chances of less damage eventuating. The core virtue of this policy is obvious: it represents a compromise, placing an equal portion of the burden of the uncertainty on both parties. But of course, in the eyes of many, this virtue will also be its main weakness: by placing half of the burden on Murray, it ensures a good chance that he will be undercompensated, and by placing half on Betsy, it ensures a good chance that she will be overcharged.
It seems to me that this discussion highlights a very simple point: what will appeal to you as the correct way to deal with uncertainty will depend on your views regarding the purpose of the burden of proof. If the spirit of the burden of proof is to ensure that innocent individuals are protected, then you will likely feel that the victim -- who is the only innocent party -- should bear less of the burden of uncertainty. On the other hand, if you view the burden of proof as protecting individuals from having to pay for damage that they have not been proven to have caused, then you will likely come down on the side of placing the burden on the victim. I will not take a stance on this issue here, since I honestly don't know what to think.
Before calling it quits on this subject, I want to touch on one more potential problem for Murray's case against Betsy. Namely, Murray might not be able to prove that Betsy's rocket will hit his house at all. It seems to me that uncertainty of this sort is very different from the kind of uncertainty discussed above. It is uncertainty regarding whether or not the harmful event will occur at all, rather than uncertainty regarding how severe the damage caused by the harmful event will be. On this issue, I think our current system has the tools to tell us what should be done. That is, our normal ideas regarding the burden of proof seem more or less adequate for dealing with cases like Murray's. Perhaps we might want to allow for a slightly more relaxed standard, given that our current standard might create a systemic bias towards placing burdens on victims, but that seems like something that can be discussed without breaking new ground.
So I guess I haven't really reached any firm conclusions about preemptive compensation in this post, but I think that as far as providing a starting point for discussion, I'm happy with this. It seems like the next step needs to be a discussion of what the proper role of the burden of proof ought to be. But I think I'll stop for now and deal with that later.
Friday, March 21, 2008
Climate Change and Getting Out of the Way
Imagine for a moment that you are Abdul, a Bangladeshi rice farmer. You have farmed rice your entire adult life, and you plan to continue into the foreseeable future. Unfortunately, Bangladesh is an extremely low-lying nation; almost all of the country's land lies below 10m above sea level, and your farm is no exception. As global temperatures rise and progressively less ice covers the Earth's surface, the sea level will predictably rise slowly over the next century.
Fortunately, Bangladesh already has a system of dykes, originally built to withstand storm surges in harsh weather, which can be bolstered to hold back the rising ocean. Your land will likely avoid becoming permanently submerged. But as sea water mixes with the water table, your rice crops could end up unable to survive the increase in salinity.
Now let's say that we were able to satisfactorily trace the rising sea levels to global climate change, and were able to trace the changes in salinity directly to the rise in sea level, so that we knew that the impacts on your land were the result of climate change. Would there be any injustice here, and if so, what kind of injustice would it be?
On one hand, it does seem like you could reasonably object to any damage directly caused by the increase in sality. Clearly we would have a problem with a group of people directly dumping a bunch of salt on your land and killing your rice crop. It seems that the problem would persist if, using underground piping, they pumped salty water into the water table under your land, even if they never left their own property. I don't see why the injustice would disappear if, using a giant oceanic turbine, the individuals propelled ocean water towards the Bangladeshi dike system, resulting in the salinization of your land. If this would be a problem, then it seems odd to say that there would be no wrong done if, using a giant furnace, the individuals melted away Arctic ice until the sea level rose, sending ocean water into your water table. Finally, then, it seems odd to think that it would be acceptable if the group of individuals released a gas into the atmosphere which would predictably result in ice melting and sea level rise, which would in turn result in ocean water entering your water table. Accordingly, it seems that if we could establish a causal link between the emitters' actions and the salinization of your land, then you would be entitled to compensation.
An important question, though, is what exactly you should be compensated for. For example, what if there were a salt-resistant variety of rice that you could use instead of the kind you had been using? Or what if you could sell your land to prawn farmers, for whom the saltier conditions were ideal? Would these alternatives lessen the injustice done to you? As Nozick writes in Anarchy, State, and Utopia, "Does the compensation to X for Y's actions take into account X's best response to these actions, or not? If X responded by rearranging his other activities and assets to limit his losses (or if he made prior provision to limit them), should this benefit Y by lessening the compensation he must pay? Alternatively, if X makes no attempt to rearrange his activities to cope with what Y has done, must Y compensate X for the full damage X suffers?" Nozick doesn't provide an answer, but it's clear that this is a question that will need to be dealt with in any conversation like this one.
Do we have an obligation to "get out of the way" of damage? Do boundary crossers have an obligation to compensate us for the inconvenience of getting out of the way, and any residual damage? Or do boundary crossers have an obligation to compensate us for the damage that would have occurred if we didn't get out of the way, regardless of what we do? This is no trivial matter. Let's say that you anticipated the sea level rise, and purchased salt-resistant rice in order to be ready. If the salt-resistant rice worked as advertised, and you could continue to farm your rice, would that be the end of the discussion? Could the emitters simply say that you adapted, and therefore they were freed from responsibility? It seems clear to me that you could still reasonably demand compensation for the inconvenience of having to switch crop varieties. And if the genetically modified rice were more expensive, or more difficult to farm, I think you could fairly demand compensation for those things as well.
But would that be the end of it? I think that on some level, this is reasonable. I could see how someone might take the alternative view, and say that you were entitled to compensation for the damage that would have occurred in the absence of adaptive behavior, and that your adaptation should benefit you, and not the boundary crosser. However, I think that perhaps we might placate the holder of this view by conceding that perhaps you are not obligated to adapt, and if you don't, you might be entitled to compensation for the damage that is done, even if you could have prevented it. This too will be objectionable, but it at least offers a starting point for debate.
There is another reason we might want to say that you should only be entitled to compensation for the inconvenience of adapting and for any residual damage: such a policy would be more efficient. Efficiency is certainly not an overriding concern in matters of justice, but that doesn't mean it is unimportant. By compensating for the inconvenience of adaptation and any residual damage, the boundary crosser would be paying for all of the actual external costs produced by her actions. Making her pay for damages which never actualize would seem to mean that we would be, in a sense, "overcharging." For boundary crossings that we don't think are worthy of prohibition, we would effectively rule out an entire class of actually net beneficial actions which, if adaptive measures were not taken, would not be net beneficial.
In the preceding discussion, however, we have implied that by switching to salt-resistant rice, you avoided more costs than you incurred during the switch. In other words, we have assumed that in the absence of compensation, it was profitable for you to switch. Given the fact that in our story you switched, it seems pretty clear that you believed it would be profitable to do so. But what if you were wrong? What if the salt-resistant rice was not a worthwhile investment? Could you reasonably demand compensation for the additional costs produced by your bad decision? On one hand, it seems like you should be held responsible, since it was your choice to try the salt-resistant rice. But on the other hand, it seems like the only reason you bought the salt-resistant rice in the first place was because you knew your land was going to be, essentially, "invaded" by salt "sent" by the emitters. I'm not completely sure what to say about this.
So where do we stand? It seems like we can legitimately say that you have reason to object to the salinization of your land, and that if you could demonstrate a causal link, you could reasonably demand compensation from those responsible. But from there, things get a little less clear. I think I'm comfortable with the idea that you are entitled to compensation for the costs of adaptation, and for any residual damage. I'm less comfortable with the idea that someone should be responsible for "adaptation" costs that actually increased the total costs of the incident (we might make the case that such behavior isn't even properly considered "adaptive"). So I guess I've arrived somewhat short of a firm conclusion. But I hope this will be a good starting point for future discussion.
Fortunately, Bangladesh already has a system of dykes, originally built to withstand storm surges in harsh weather, which can be bolstered to hold back the rising ocean. Your land will likely avoid becoming permanently submerged. But as sea water mixes with the water table, your rice crops could end up unable to survive the increase in salinity.
Now let's say that we were able to satisfactorily trace the rising sea levels to global climate change, and were able to trace the changes in salinity directly to the rise in sea level, so that we knew that the impacts on your land were the result of climate change. Would there be any injustice here, and if so, what kind of injustice would it be?
On one hand, it does seem like you could reasonably object to any damage directly caused by the increase in sality. Clearly we would have a problem with a group of people directly dumping a bunch of salt on your land and killing your rice crop. It seems that the problem would persist if, using underground piping, they pumped salty water into the water table under your land, even if they never left their own property. I don't see why the injustice would disappear if, using a giant oceanic turbine, the individuals propelled ocean water towards the Bangladeshi dike system, resulting in the salinization of your land. If this would be a problem, then it seems odd to say that there would be no wrong done if, using a giant furnace, the individuals melted away Arctic ice until the sea level rose, sending ocean water into your water table. Finally, then, it seems odd to think that it would be acceptable if the group of individuals released a gas into the atmosphere which would predictably result in ice melting and sea level rise, which would in turn result in ocean water entering your water table. Accordingly, it seems that if we could establish a causal link between the emitters' actions and the salinization of your land, then you would be entitled to compensation.
An important question, though, is what exactly you should be compensated for. For example, what if there were a salt-resistant variety of rice that you could use instead of the kind you had been using? Or what if you could sell your land to prawn farmers, for whom the saltier conditions were ideal? Would these alternatives lessen the injustice done to you? As Nozick writes in Anarchy, State, and Utopia, "Does the compensation to X for Y's actions take into account X's best response to these actions, or not? If X responded by rearranging his other activities and assets to limit his losses (or if he made prior provision to limit them), should this benefit Y by lessening the compensation he must pay? Alternatively, if X makes no attempt to rearrange his activities to cope with what Y has done, must Y compensate X for the full damage X suffers?" Nozick doesn't provide an answer, but it's clear that this is a question that will need to be dealt with in any conversation like this one.
Do we have an obligation to "get out of the way" of damage? Do boundary crossers have an obligation to compensate us for the inconvenience of getting out of the way, and any residual damage? Or do boundary crossers have an obligation to compensate us for the damage that would have occurred if we didn't get out of the way, regardless of what we do? This is no trivial matter. Let's say that you anticipated the sea level rise, and purchased salt-resistant rice in order to be ready. If the salt-resistant rice worked as advertised, and you could continue to farm your rice, would that be the end of the discussion? Could the emitters simply say that you adapted, and therefore they were freed from responsibility? It seems clear to me that you could still reasonably demand compensation for the inconvenience of having to switch crop varieties. And if the genetically modified rice were more expensive, or more difficult to farm, I think you could fairly demand compensation for those things as well.
But would that be the end of it? I think that on some level, this is reasonable. I could see how someone might take the alternative view, and say that you were entitled to compensation for the damage that would have occurred in the absence of adaptive behavior, and that your adaptation should benefit you, and not the boundary crosser. However, I think that perhaps we might placate the holder of this view by conceding that perhaps you are not obligated to adapt, and if you don't, you might be entitled to compensation for the damage that is done, even if you could have prevented it. This too will be objectionable, but it at least offers a starting point for debate.
There is another reason we might want to say that you should only be entitled to compensation for the inconvenience of adapting and for any residual damage: such a policy would be more efficient. Efficiency is certainly not an overriding concern in matters of justice, but that doesn't mean it is unimportant. By compensating for the inconvenience of adaptation and any residual damage, the boundary crosser would be paying for all of the actual external costs produced by her actions. Making her pay for damages which never actualize would seem to mean that we would be, in a sense, "overcharging." For boundary crossings that we don't think are worthy of prohibition, we would effectively rule out an entire class of actually net beneficial actions which, if adaptive measures were not taken, would not be net beneficial.
In the preceding discussion, however, we have implied that by switching to salt-resistant rice, you avoided more costs than you incurred during the switch. In other words, we have assumed that in the absence of compensation, it was profitable for you to switch. Given the fact that in our story you switched, it seems pretty clear that you believed it would be profitable to do so. But what if you were wrong? What if the salt-resistant rice was not a worthwhile investment? Could you reasonably demand compensation for the additional costs produced by your bad decision? On one hand, it seems like you should be held responsible, since it was your choice to try the salt-resistant rice. But on the other hand, it seems like the only reason you bought the salt-resistant rice in the first place was because you knew your land was going to be, essentially, "invaded" by salt "sent" by the emitters. I'm not completely sure what to say about this.
So where do we stand? It seems like we can legitimately say that you have reason to object to the salinization of your land, and that if you could demonstrate a causal link, you could reasonably demand compensation from those responsible. But from there, things get a little less clear. I think I'm comfortable with the idea that you are entitled to compensation for the costs of adaptation, and for any residual damage. I'm less comfortable with the idea that someone should be responsible for "adaptation" costs that actually increased the total costs of the incident (we might make the case that such behavior isn't even properly considered "adaptive"). So I guess I've arrived somewhat short of a firm conclusion. But I hope this will be a good starting point for future discussion.
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